

## Line of Battle Series:

*Last Chance for Victory*

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**Game and Series Designer:** Dean Essig**Research Assistance:** Eric Wittenberg, Earl Hess, John Heiser, Dave Powell, Jerry Axel**Compilation Map Research and Original Sketch Map:** Rick Barber**Proofing:** Hans Korting**Playtesting:**

Christopher Anthony, Jerry Axel, Curtis Baer, Daniel Broh-Kahn, Jeff Coyle, Francis Czawlytko, John Essig, Don Evans, Mark Guttag, Hans Kishel, John Kisner, Joe Linder, John Long, Ben Magnus, Rod Miller, Chip Pharr, Dave Powell, Marty Schaubel, Ken Spuda, Jim Stravers, Dan Taylor

same thing), but it also means that the cuts are not represented by some sort of 100 yard across expanse, either. I think the former is a mild price to pay to avoid the latter.

c) The McPherson Quarry (vic N27.25) has no effect on play itself, but the associated Vertical Slope hexside is impassable. Likewise, the seemingly minor McPherson's Pond (N27.27) also provides a blocking hexside.

d) The White Triangular Mileage Markers indicate every 8 MPs along the major routes to ease counting during play.

e) The symbols for the Lutheran Theological Seminary and Pennsylvania College buildings accurately depict the actual period roof of these buildings. (To include *not showing* the dormers added after the battle.)

f) The various cemetery plots and boundaries on the map have no effect on play.

g) The game comes with the four maps covering the entirety of the main battle area (Maps A, B, C, and D) plus two maps that isolate the primary battle areas of the 1<sup>st</sup> Day and the 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> Days. Combining these two maps allows playing of the entire battle on a two map footprint. The map arrangement chosen impacts both the set up and the Orders of Arrival that are used. Crimping the battle into just the two maps does cause a large portion of the Confederate rear areas (needed for movement between the two maps) to fall off map. When

playing the two-map version of the campaign, the Confederates can move between N29.14/N31.14 and S9.23 at the cost of 5 turns. (*Optional:* To add some uncertainty to this timing—and recreate the historical march of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Day—at the end of the 5 turns roll one die. On a 5 or 6, allow the force to enter. On any other roll, try again the next turn. Regardless of any roll, the force enters 3 hours after it exited if it has not already done so.)

**1.0c Hex Numbers.** The grid is divided into two major sections (because of the multiple map configurations that are possible), “North” and “South”. The various map possibilities lie atop this grid in a way that reduces confusion as best as possible. Note that the grid was **not** extended all the way (1.xx through 124.xx) because of the limitations of the type space available.

**1.0d The Turn Record Chart.** To make an accurate rendition of sunrise and sunset times, the Turn Record Chart guides the player from using the 15-Minute track (most day turns) to the hour track itself before going to the 30-Minute track (most night turns).

*For example: At 6:00 p.m. in the evening, the player continues to use the 15 Min Track and marker. Once you are about to start the 7:00 p.m. turn, set aside the 15 Min Track marker and use the Hour marker (only) for 7:00, 7:15, 7:30, 7:45, 8:00, 8:15, and 8:30. The next turn after 8:30 p.m. is 9:00 p.m. at which point, the Hour marker will be in the 9:00 p.m. box and the marker used for the 15 Min Track earlier will go in the “:00” part of the 30 Min Track. Use that track normally until the process reverses itself at 3:30 a.m.*

## 1.0 Common Special Rules

**1.0a Breastworks.** The Federal player has **15 Breastwork markers available**. The Confederates have none. (Yes, the Confederates did build some limited Breastworks on Seminary Ridge). Federal Breastwork markers can only be built in hexes containing at least a bit of the Woods symbol.

### 1.0b Map Notes.

a) Farmer names in *parentheses* are tenants, not landowners. Those *without parentheses* actually own their land.

b) Vertical Slope hexsides are used to indicate the location of the Railroad Cuts northwest of town. The point there is that units cannot **cross** them (except in spots where other features allow crossing). Technically, this means that a regiment cannot get stuck *inside* a RR Cut (but can be destroyed by being forced to retreat through one, which is effectively the

## 2.0 July 1st 1863

For an assortment of reasons, the Battle of Gettysburg began in a very specific way. Since neither Army Commander (represented by the player) is present, much of the opening is out of the player's control. Once the commanders do arrive, they must feel out the situation and proceed with caution. As a result, a number of rules that either hamstring the player or give the player additional "powers" are needed to fit the historical parameters. Yes, this takes some of the early battle's control away from the player, but at that point many circumstances were already in motion that the commander (player) could not foresee or modify.

For players wishing to remove all or some of these conditions (generating what has been termed "Panzergruppe Hill"), they can be lifted at will. The player should be forewarned that this freedom will allow events to happen at a far, far greater rate... probably leading to a complete Federal defeat by the morning of July 2<sup>nd</sup> at the latest. (Unfortunately a feature of pretty much every Gettysburg title heretofore.)

### 2.1 Confederate First Day Rules

Sent with orders to avoid a general engagement and expecting to meet only militia, Heth's advance was methodical and cautious. Planning on scattering the "militia" with a little artillery fire, Heth had Pegram's artillery lead the column out of Cashtown. Meeting the Federal cavalry, the infantry deployed a screen of skirmishers who, slowly, pushed them back on their main defense line. Certainly, Heth was not in a rush, he did not know that a major engagement was about to begin, and he also had no idea how critical time had become.

The rules below restrain the player from making use of his hindsight to have the fight play out in a way Heth could not have imagined necessary at the time. Once Lee (the player) arrives and gets a grasp of what is going on, the leash will be loosened.

#### 2.1a Confederate Skirmishers.

Heth's Division deployed a line of skirmishers that (slowly) pushed the cavalry videttes in front of them. These are not shown literally, but the units supplying them (three infantry regiments) representing their main body reserves are used to indicate the rough location of the skirmish line. Do not confuse these 'ghost' skirmishers with any sort of actual Open Order unit. These three units ignore Command Radius until Archer starts a turn on Map A (8:45 a.m.) (even if not all of Map A is in play); afterwards Command Radius applies to them normally.

**2.1b Deployment.** No Confederate unit can move east of the Herr Ridge Road until all units of Arch/Heth and Dav/Heth (minus 11 Miss) begin a turn in *Line* formation in that road's hexes. From the beginning of the game until the Recon in Force period ends (see 2.1c), no Confederate unit can switch to *Column* formation once in *Line* and no unit can move east of the Herr Ridge Road in *Column*. Artillery, HQs, and Leaders are unaffected by this rule.

**2.1c Recon in Force.** The turn Heth's units move east of the Herr Ridge Road *Recon in Force* automatically begins. It constitutes an "attack order" with the following exceptions: a) There are no Fluke Stoppage Rolls, b) Only Archer's and Davis' brigades can attack and c) There is no need to conduct Attack Recovery because of these combats afterwards. **No other orders are allowed during this period.**

During *Recon in Force*, Heth (marking the center of his Command Radius) must remain **directly on** the Chambersburg Pike.

*Recon in Force* ends at 12:15 p.m., if any Union unit moves west of xx.22 (inclusive), or if the Confederate player "calls off" the attack (per LoB 10.7a). When it ends, all *Recon in Force* restrictions terminate and so does Heth's "attack order."

**2.1d Lee.** Lee has "Not so Sure" Awareness. It is possible for his Awareness to jump to "On Fire," see 2.2h.

Lee cannot issue any orders until the turn **after** Ewell successfully makes his Command Roll (see 2.1e).

**Urged to Action.** Once able to issue orders **and** Ewell's order requires Rodes' Division (ignoring Doles' Brigade and the Sharpshooters) to attack southward *along* and/or *west* of Oak/Seminary Ridge, Lee can make one order that is implemented immediately. Merely make a Command Roll for Lee. If successful, generate one order to Hill's Corps with instructions for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps divisions and Artillery Battalions *on hand* at that moment and they can begin to act on that order in the next game turn. This order need not be accepted by other Leaders nor relayed down to any formation.

Lee can only do this once and cannot do it on any turn **after** he issues any order using the normal system (in other words, if this rule is to be used, it must be used for the *first order* Lee gives).

#### Long Nights for Walter Taylor.

Lee **cannot** issue orders at night on July 1<sup>st</sup> and until 8:00 a.m. on the 2<sup>nd</sup>, and **cannot** issue orders (at midnight) on the night of July 2<sup>nd</sup> (see 2.2h).

**Historical Note:** Lee was in no position to issue orders on the night of July 1<sup>st</sup> as the situation and ground was too nebulous to make any major decisions. He attempted to do so on the night of July 2<sup>nd</sup>, but was unable to get a clear order out to his corps commanders to ensure that the desired operation occurred. This was

*the result of two problems, both of his own making: the corps commanders were not ordered to HQ to obtain coordinated instructions and his staff was incapable of filling in the gap this mistake created with clear orders. In a game sense, the easiest way to show these failings is to not allow Lee to issue orders during either night.*

**2.1e Ewell.** Ewell can create one order on the 1<sup>st</sup> for any purpose. Ewell must be stacked with the recipient and make a successful Command Roll. Once he does this, write up the desired order and that order takes effect that same turn. If he fails the roll, he can try again each turn until he succeeds. Note that the order's content affects Lee in 2.1d. If this order applies to Rodes' Division, it can contain separate instructions for Rode's detachment (3.2d).

**2.1f Hill's Restrictions.** The lack of available recon and Hill's seemingly out of commission status makes it so that Hill's HQ is required to stay directly on the Chambersburg Pike until his HQ enters N26.27 (the top of West McPherson's Ridge). Once it enters that hex, it is no longer constrained by this rule.

*Remember, by default, this restricts the ability of Heth and Pender to 'swing wide' in their attack before this location is clear enough to allow the HQ to enter.*

This is in addition to the requirement for Heth (himself) to stay on the Chambersburg Pike until the Recon in Force ends (2.1c),

## 2.2 Federal First Day Rules

*Buford's cavalry executed a masterful delaying action while falling back on their main defensive line. At that point, they briefly defended the ridge before allowing the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps infantry to take over the fight. Reynolds arrived and agreed with Buford's decision to hold west of town and began hustling his infantry into line.*

**2.2a Who Ever Saw a Dead Cavalryman?** Keep track of the losses inflicted on the cavalry units (not Calef's artillery) by counting **only** losses from Opening Volley and the Combat Table (Morale and Retreat through ZOC losses do not count).

If there are one or more losses, roll one die at the very start of the Union player's turn. If the roll is equal to or less than the number of losses, remove all the units of 1/Cav from play. Calef's Battery is unaffected by this roll.

**2.2b The Infantry Deploys.** The first Union player turn that any unit of 1 Corps **will** switch to Line formation, if the cavalry has not been removed because of 2.2a, remove them from play as if they had failed the roll. Do this when the Union player *expects* a unit to switch to Line formation and do it **before** any cavalry units move or fire. If the player does not remove the cavalry, the infantry **cannot** deploy into Line that turn.

**2.2c Reynolds.** *Until Reynolds was able to assess the situation to Buford's front, the march of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps forward was relaxed. The infantry was not expecting a major confrontation. That attitude changed soon enough. Reynolds moved rapidly once he intercepted a messenger from Buford telling him of the urgent situation. He rode through Gettysburg, stopping at the George George (yes, really...) house to obtain directions. Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. (accounts vary greatly), he met with Buford (possibly at the Seminary, as popularly thought) and then rode forward to observe the field. He began issuing orders at 10:00 a.m., sending dispatches to Generals Meade, Howard, and Sickles. He then returned to the Codori house, ordered Wadsworth to get his men moving and sent his staff back to clear the fences on a shortcut to the battlefield.*

Reynolds is unable to issue any orders until 9:30 a.m. When he does so, he will be an acting army commander with On Fire Awareness.

His first order, however, is "automatic" to Wadsworth's Division. At 9:30 a.m. the player merely jots down the desired instructions for 1/1 and it is implemented that turn. **Reynolds' automatic order cannot contain instructions to attack further west than Willoughby Run.**

Reynolds' movement to the front is abstractly handled by the Order of Arrival. This is merely for its informational value, if desired the player can leave him with the troops.

**2.2d Double Quick.** The following units can take advantage of *Double Quick*:

Reynolds  
Doubleday  
1 Corps HQ  
1/1 Division (but not the 7 Ind 2/1/1)  
2/1 Division  
Hall's Battery  
2/3/1 (only, not 1/3/1 or Rowley).

Just so there is no confusion, *Double Quick* does not apply to Buford's cavalry, Mr. Burns, or other reinforcements. They all move normally.

To use *Double Quick*, Reynolds must have issued the automatic order (2.2c) and the Road Column head must be at or north of the Peach Orchard (S9.28) at the **beginning** of its move. If a particular Road Column has not yet made it to S9.28, those units only move normally.

When *Double Quick* can be used, the following apply:

- 1) The special movement rates are in **hexes**, not MPs, and road terrain costs **do not** increase or decrease speed in any way.
- 2) If going through town, the *Intersection Rule* (LoB 1.7g) applies normally and the column must go north on Washington Street and turn west onto Chambersburg Street.
- 3) The column cannot divert off the Emmitsburg Road south of N61.35.



4) While using *Double Quick*, units move double (2x) their MA in hexes (not MPs.)

No unit can use *Double Quick* to move into a hex adjacent to any enemy unit. No units can change out of Column or Limbered formation before having ended *Double Quick*. Units can use their hexes of movement to collapse their Road Column when doing *Double Quick* (merely move the head of the column a little slower so that the following Road Column markers can catch up).

**When it Ends.** *Double Quick* ends for a unit the turn it switches to *Line* or *Unlimbered* formation. It ends for leaders and HQs when they finish any move north of N45.xx. On that turn, move the unit (for its player turn) without any *Double Quick* and move using normal MAs, movement rules & costs allowing firing and Charges. Once a unit stops using *Double Quick*, it cannot use it again. Do this on a unit-by-unit basis.

**2.2e The Iron Brigade Breaks Camp.** Iron/1/1 left camp after a short delay that allowed a gap to form between them and Cutler's Brigade. The Order of Arrival provides a die roll to release them. Roll each turn at the beginning of the Union Player Turn until they are released. Until released, the Iron/1/1 units *cannot* move or change formation.

**2.2f Our Man Burns.** John Burns can **only** help morale, he has **no** Command or Initiative value. **He moves as a Leader, but has an MA of only 6.** Burns can never lead a Charge or assist a Closing Roll attempt.

**2.2g Reynolds' Death.** Obviously, the battle would have unfolded much differently without Reynolds' death. Also, no player will ever risk getting this superb leader killed. So Reynolds *must* die 'on schedule'. Expect the Confederate player to exact a high price for the option that allows Reynolds to live (5.1a).

Just so it is clear, Reynolds' death has no effect on any orders that exist at that time.

**2.2h Reynolds Picked the Ground: You Get to Defend it.** *John Reynolds forced the hand of the Army of the Potomac by deciding to fight for time west of Seminary Ridge for the army to concentrate. You must do so as well. (The easy gamer decision, based on hindsight, is to bolt for Cemetery Hill while 1<sup>st</sup> Corps is intact. I'm not going to let you do that.)*

If the Confederates occupy any hex along the road from N30.33 to N36.33 (inclusive) at the **end** of any Union Player Turn on or before 4:00 p.m. 1 July, the following occurs:

- 1) Lee enters "On Fire" awareness for the remainder of the game.
- 2) Early and Rodes do not flip to their 0-rated sides.
- 3) Lee can issue orders at midnight each day and is not restricted on the morning of the 2<sup>nd</sup>.

There is no penalty for this happening at 4:15 p.m. or later on July 1<sup>st</sup>.

## 3.0 Confederate Special Rules

### 3.1 All My Generals

*One of the key features of the battle (long a point of contention for historians) was the suddenly balky nature of the Confederate high command—Lee, his corps commanders, and a number of divisional leaders seemed suddenly gripped with indecision that certainly did not characterize them either before or after this particular battle.*

*After the war, an effort was made to blame the mistakes made on specific leaders (anyone other than Lee) which made for extensive (and rather pointless) blame and counter-accusation arguments for the next forty or more years between the*

*participants and even longer with following historians.*

*Thereafter (seemingly to make up for this 'Lost Cause' mentality), the pendulum swung hard the other way and gave an image of Lee surrounded by some who knew better, but that he was incapable of making rational decisions and when he did they went against wise counsel and were mistakes. This was done to 'correct' (by tearing down, a popular modern way to handle revered persons of the past) the image of Lee as, what has been called, "the Marble Man."*

*As is almost always the case, the truth is somewhere in the middle of these extremes.*

*Several Confederate generals showed two faces during this battle. My notes extensively analyze the conclusions I came to on the sensitive subject of James Longstreet and the not so contentious issue of Richard Ewell. The others can be handled in brief here.*

*Lee was more cautious than usual as he did not know the ground or the enemy situation as well as he normally did. Also, he (like most everyone else in the Army of Northern Virginia) knew that this battle was the one to potentially win the war. Those two situations combined to slow the decision making process on July 2<sup>nd</sup> to await the results of the various reconnaissance teams he sent out in the pre-dawn hours. Others have suggested that he was lethargic and "operating in a fog" due to either a heart condition or the effects of Pennsylvanian food. I have to disagree with those assessments. There are options here to test those theories. I think you'll find them in error as the Lee they portray cannot issue the orders he did in the time he used.*

*Rodes was visibly ill by the night of the 1<sup>st</sup> and bedridden enough by the evening of the 2<sup>nd</sup> that he left his division in the hands of its brigadiers who took a vote and decided they*

could not advance onto Cemetery Hill while Early's men were being driven off of it.

Early (of all people) seems to have become unnerved by the evening of the 1<sup>st</sup> and was a consistent voice of caution in Ewell's ear for the rest of the battle (and Lee's as well, if his self-centered account is accurate).

A.P. Hill was simply non-functioning for the duration of the battle.

Except for brief "Oh, and Hill was there, too" comments, it's almost possible to make an argument that the man wasn't even **at** the Battle of Gettysburg.

**3.1a Longstreet.** Longstreet's counter has two sides, one 2-rated and the other 0-rated. Use the 2-rated side when he is accepting any Move Order and the 0-rated side when accepting any Attack Order.

Should Longstreet become Army Commander, he uses his 2-rated side with a "Not so Sure" Awareness for the remainder of the battle.

**3.1b Rodes and Early.** These men are given counters with two sides, one good and one not so good. The OOA specifies which to use and when to change them.

## 3.2 Lower Confederate Command

**3.2a Trimble.** Trimble is a spare Division commander. When available, he can be used to replace any Confederate Division commander who is killed, wounded, or captured. When Trimble is in charge of a given division, do not apply the modifier for original Divisional Leader wounded or killed on the Fluke Stoppage Table. The player need merely announce that Trimble is in command of the given division. Once assigned, Trimble cannot be re-assigned to another division later.

### 3.2b Corps Artillery Leaders.

Alexander, J.T. Brown, and R. Walker can post any battery, act as an Artillery Leader and give Initiative orders to any Artillery Battalion within their corps.

### 3.2c Sharpshooters in Rodes' Division.

SS/Rodes units can trace Command Radius to Rodes, Blackford, or any brigade leader in Rodes' Division. If used for Command Radius, Blackford must be in the Command Radius of any of Rodes' other leaders. SS/Rodes does not roll for Fluke Stoppage—they are tied to the orders of the Leader to which they are tracing Command Radius.

### 3.2d Rodes' Divisional Detachment.

Doles' Brigade was detached to cover the area from the left flank of Rodes' Division and to Early's right on the afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup>. Doles joined into the attack on 11<sup>th</sup> Corps with Early's Division.

Doles can trace Command Radius back to either Early or Rodes. Once Early or Rodes' attacks end, Doles must permanently return to using only Rodes as his source of Command Radius.

**3.2e Early's Detachment.** Smith's Brigade of Early's Division spends most of the battle off the east map edge guarding the Confederate left flank. That brigade **can** be used as Early's Reserve Brigade for Fluke Stoppage even while off map. Early's situation becomes "normal" once Smith enters play.

## 3.3 Other Confederate Special Rules

**3.3a Supply.** All Confederate supply trains are only available off map. Measure "by Caisson" ranges to the given entry hexes. "By Battery" is accomplished by exiting those hexes. Expend the needed ammunition and then roll one die. The result is the number of turns in the future the battery returns. Returning batteries must do so at the Entry Area from which they exited.

# 4.0 Federal Special Rules

## 4.1 Command

**4.1a Meade.** Meade has "Normal" Awareness but cannot issue any orders until the first twilight turn on the morning of July 2<sup>nd</sup>. Meade can issue orders normally at midnight on the night of July 2<sup>nd</sup>.

### 4.1b Acting Army Commanders.

The senior Leader on the field is the *Acting Army Commander* until Meade arrives. Acting Army Commanders function exactly like a regular Army Commander in every way, except that they have no Army HQ (and ignore any restrictions based on one).

Seniority runs from Reynolds to Slocum to Howard. Hancock *does not* rank Slocum or Howard. Meade, of course, ranks everyone.

No Acting Army Commander can issue orders at night.

The Acting Army Commander cannot command his own corps at the same time—promote the current ranking divisional commander to command the corps for the interim.

When Hancock arrives, he *shares* army command with Howard (so the Union has two Army Commanders for a time). Howard can only issue orders to his own corps. When Slocum arrives, he becomes Acting Army Commander, Hancock returns to his corps (simply remove his counter from play), and Howard reverts to just being a corps commander.

**4.1c Slocum.** Slocum commands the "Right Wing" (5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Corps). He acts as a second army commander with the ability to issue orders to those corps. Meade can ignore Slocum when making orders directly to these corps; Slocum is merely an additional commander the Union player can use to get orders for this wing.

**4.1d Acting Army Commanders Awareness.** Acting Army Commanders have the following awareness:

*On Fire:* Reynolds and Hancock  
*Normal:* Howard  
*Not so Sure:* Slocum

## 4.2 Looking for Glory

The Confederate player can “order” the Federal player’s troops to do something especially stupid representing various Federal leaders doing what seems best for their own needs rather than for the army’s. The player can do this once on July 2<sup>nd</sup>.

At 8:00 a.m. on the 2<sup>nd</sup>, the Confederate player selects the time the order will be issued. It can be any turn from that turn until dark on that day. He need not decide what that order will be at that point.

On that turn, do the following until you have a “winner”:

- 1) The Confederate player selects a Union corps.
- 2) The Union player rolls one die. If the roll is equal to or less than the corps commander’s Command Value, the corps is not selected. If the roll is greater than the Command Value, the rule affects **that** corps.
- 3) Repeat until a corps is selected or the Union player runs out of corps. In the case of the latter, no corps follows this rule.

Try each corps only once and ignore any corps whose HQ is not yet on the map.

The Leader in question is ordered to move his HQ location to a location 12 hexes (or less) forward from his current location as indicated by the Confederate player (if possible, use a terrain feature to make the order easier to follow).

The Federal player, for his part, must follow the instructed movement as if it was an order he issued. He **cannot**

be ordered to do any actual attack (i.e. told to move into an area currently-or soon to be-occupied by the enemy). The order is merely to ‘move’ the corps to the new location. It is not an actual Move Order and there is no formation requirement for any unit during it.

The order must be issued at the start of the Federal player’s Activity Phase and must be followed as of that phase. The Federal player cannot issue the affected Command new orders (or Skedaddle) for **2 hours** (8 turns) counting that turn.

## 4.3 Other Federal Special Rules

**4.3a Henry Hunt.** Hunt can act as an Artillery Leader for any Federal battery and post any battery, or Artillery *battalion* in the Federal army. Hunt does not need to give orders to do this; he need merely stack with the battalion’s Leader and its HQ and posts the entire battalion as you would a single battery.

**4.3b Supply.** Several Corps **never** have a Wagon arrive for them (1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> Corps). These must use the Army Arty Res ammunition supply. **The exception is 1<sup>st</sup> Corps which can also use the 11<sup>th</sup> Corps Wagon.**

**4.3c Lockwood’s Brigade.** Technically, Lockwood’s Brigade in 12<sup>th</sup> Corps is assigned directly to the corps HQ (a matter of rank in the convoluted organization of the corps). Rather than force the player to jump through hoops for this, they are assigned to 1/12 here, which is where they will be after the battle and how they acted during it.

**4.3d Calef’s Battery.** Calef’s Battery has an HQ to allow more freedom of movement early in the battle. This “Battery” HQ has an Artillery Battalion HQ’s Command Radius and acts as one for all purposes.

**4.3e The Army Reserve.** v.Steinwehr’s Division (2/11) is placed into “army reserve” when it first enters play. This

means the division is restricted to the area at or within 6 hexes of N49.45 until 4:00 p.m.

**4.3f Tyler.** Tyler is the commander of the Army of the Potomac’s Artillery Reserve. He functions the same as Henry Hunt (4.3a), except his authority is limited to the Artillery Reserve Battalions and their batteries (not the batteries belonging to the corps) as well as the Arty Res Supply Train. *As an historical aside, at some point on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, Tyler succumbed to heat stroke and was no longer commanding the Artillery Reserve—as best I could determine, this occurred after Pickett’s Charge began, hence he is still on the map in those scenarios.*

## 5.0 Optional Rules

*These options are all designed to tweak the historical parameters of the game either to explore “what ifs” or if you feel my choices are all wet. Just remember, a “major” variant will shift the game greatly toward the side getting it. Mixing in numerous variations at once will generate unpredictable results, but you can tell the overall slant by the groupings chosen. Have fun!*

They are designed primarily for campaign starts, but can be implemented with any scenario.

### 5.1 Major Union Variants

**5.1a Reynolds’ Death.** Ignore 2.2g. Reynolds does not die according to the Order of Arrival (*if the player gets him killed anyway, that’s his problem*).

If this option is chosen, make the following changes to the Union Order of Arrival:



July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1863

Turn	Entry Area	Units
3:00 p.m.	-	Hancock (do not have him enter play at this point)
3:30 p.m.	G	12 Corps (all)
4:00 p.m.	J	3 Corps (all)

Each corps is to report to the Acting Army Commander for orders. Restrictions, such as those normally applying to 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps and the Artillery Reserve, are not in effect. Howard arrives as a corps commander only.

*Obviously, this is a massive adjustment to the historical timeline. The historical rationale for the times are as follows: Sickles got first word that Reynolds thought he should come up via his aide Henry Tramain between 11:30 a.m. and noon (Tramain left a very much alive Reynolds with those instructions, so the change in the timeline in this option has not had the ability to propagate to Sickles as yet). Sickles then became indecisive about whether he should obey the order from Reynolds or the one he had just gotten from Meade so he did nothing (except try to clarify things) until he got a new order (from Howard) a little after 3 p.m. Assuming that Reynolds was still alive, and aware that Sickles needed a greater prodding, the only possibility is that an additional order would have cleared up the problem at some point between noon and 3 p.m. (a 3 hour window). For argument's sake, I gave Reynolds credit for two of the three hours and assumed that the direct order to "come on" would have hastened 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps to come as an entirety.*

*Slocum has a similar timeline. 12<sup>th</sup> Corps pulled into Two Taverns (4-5 miles away) a little before noon. He got his "please come" order from Howard between 1:30 and 2 p.m., but did not begin to move until 3:00 p.m. The assumption then is that not only would Reynolds have thought to urge Slocum on sooner than Howard did, but that Reynolds had enough rank horsepower to actually get results. It took Slocum almost an hour and*

*a half to get on the road after getting word from Howard (and even then sent Geary ahead by himself so that he, Slocum, would not be tagged with the catastrophe he expected to land in Howard's lap). So, I'll assume that Reynolds would get word to Slocum about an hour earlier than Howard did, and Slocum would take only an hour to get going (as well as bringing his whole command). That brings him into the game 1.5 hours earlier than Geary alone shows up historically. I did not change 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps other than to keep Hancock with his corps.*

**5.1b All the Ducks in a Line.** Ignore 4.2 and no Union corps goes off solo.

**5.1c Slocum the Incredible.** After finally deciding to heed Howard's request to come to the field, Slocum wanted to take his corps and fall into the Union defensive line north-east of Gettysburg (11<sup>th</sup> Corps' right flank). As it turns out, only one division (Ruger's) made the cross march from the Baltimore Pike to the Hanover Road to execute this plan (Geary was intercepted and kept on the main road). Finding Confederate cavalry blocking the route, Ruger was in the process of deploying to attack Benner's Hill when new orders arrived for him to pull back and return to the army via the Baltimore Pike.

*This variant allows players to explore the rather unlikely event that Slocum was willing to press the attack with his entire corps that evening (keep in mind that this is the same general who was less than thrilled at the idea of showing up at Gettysburg and taking any of the blame for the fiasco away from Howard in the first place).*

Allow 12<sup>th</sup> Corps (all, minus 12 Corps Supply which enters the game normally) to enter play at Entry Area F at 6:30 p.m. on July 1<sup>st</sup> (ignore all other entries and times for 12<sup>th</sup> Corps). The corps has orders to Attack onto Benner's Hill.

At 6:00 p.m., have Smith/Early enter at Entry Area E to move to N37.60 to defend.

Additionally, should the Union line be holding north of town at 6:00 p.m., allow the entries above, but with 12<sup>th</sup> Corps operating under orders to Move to fill in the right of the Union defensive line, Smith's Brigade is to move to rejoin Early's Division (and not to Benner's Hill).

## 5.2 Major Confederate Variants

**5.2a Releasing Hill.** Ignore 2.1b (Deployment), 2.1c (Recon in Force), and 2.1f (Hill's Restrictions). Also, ignore the Order of Arrival restrictions on Pettigrew and Brockenborough's brigades. *This allows Hill to slam into the enemy as normally occurs in Gettysburg games.*

**5.2b Lee's Not Puzzled.** Ignore all of 2.1d. Lee enters with "Not So Sure" Awareness (2.2h applies normally) and is otherwise not restricted. *This dramatically frees Lee to act in the first 18 hours of the battle.*

**5.2c Longstreet: The way he remembers himself.** Ignore 3.1a and play Longstreet as a 4-4 rated corps commander.

**5.2d Lee has a real Staff.** Ignore the Long Nights for Walter Taylor portion of 2.1d. Lee has a staff up to the task of sending out coordinated orders at night (both the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup>). Other portions of 2.1d remain in effect.

**5.2e The Five Brigades.** *In the middle of May, 1863, torn between the competing needs of the proposed Pennsylvania invasion and possible action in the Western Theater, Jefferson Davis denied Lee's request to return these five brigades to the Army of Northern Virginia. They were five experienced brigades of great value not only in and of themselves, but in the effect they would have had on the ANVA's reorganization after Chancellorsville.*

If these brigades are used in the game, Heth's Division will not exist (Heth

himself will not be used). Instead, Robert Ransom commands a division of R/Ran, Ev/Ran, Ck/Ran, Dav/Heth and Pett/Heth. At the opening of the battle, replace Heth's own arrival with R. Ransom and Ck/Ran enters in the place of Arch/Heth. Ev/Ran enters when Brock/Heth would have. Brock/Heth and Arch/Heth belong to (and enter with) Pender's Division. In later scenarios, do the same replacements, but apply 50% losses to Ck/Ran.

The additional brigades of Pickett (Corse and Jenkins) enter the turn after Armistead's Brigade. If already set up, arrange the two brigades with the rest of the division in any way that makes sense. *Adding the two brigades to Pickett's Charge is an interesting experiment. Give it a try!*

### 5.3 Minor Variants

**5.3a Let the Cav Fight!** Ignore 2.2a and 2.2b. Buford's Cavalry stays in the battle until 12:00 noon on 2 July. Remove them on that turn. *They'll do a lot of fighting—which is well beyond their capabilities.*

**5.3b Free up Reynolds.** Ignore 2.2c and allow Reynolds to act as an "On Fire" Army Commander from the very beginning of the game. *There is a give and take to this one, you can start earlier, but lose the automatic order to Wadsworth.*

**5.3c Iron Brigade Skips Coffee.** Ignore 2.2e and allow the Iron Brigade to freely join the rest of their division on the march north. *This will get ugly for Heth.*

**5.3d The Killer Angels.** Replace the B-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5) with the optional A-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5). *Won't matter in the bigger picture, but might be something some players just will not accept.*

## 6.0 Campaign Victory

*Last Chance for Victory is a game about the battle itself. The fun comes from trying to better your opponent and see what happens as a result on the field. For most players, telling them that they will recognize it when they win is plenty—but a minority will take that as a license to do something pointless like building a fortress around a few hexes, ignoring all other concerns, and ruin the fun for both sides.*

*To avoid this type of play, what follows is a guide to determining "victory" by basically giving both sides reasons to do more than just build a fortress.*

*Note that it is a matter beyond the scope of the game to state that your win in play will cause the war itself to go one-way or another. That's a good subject for your post-game discussions with your opponent—what do the results of our game mean in the greater context of the war? What will happen next and why?*

So, to get you aimed in the right (opposite of your opponent's) direction:

The Confederates win if they have any **Unlimbered Artillery** at or within 4 hexes of N48.46 (The Cemetery Gate House) at the end of play. The strength, Morale State, or Ammunition status of the artillery is not a concern.

The Union wins if they avoid the Confederate condition and there are no Confederate infantry units in any hex of the Taneytown Road and the Baltimore Pike (south and east of Cemetery Hill).

Any other result is a draw.

**Design Note:** *Why these? The battle happened in the first place because all the roads led to this location. Cemetery Hill dominated the town and its road nexus. Should the hill fall to the Confederates, there is little reason for the Union army to remain on this ground to fight—a good case could be made that given the loss (and lack of recapture) of the hill controlling the roads, the Army of the Potomac would reform elsewhere to continue the campaign. The "roads being cut" portion exists simply because the presence of an isolated Union fortress on Cemetery Hill is not a realistic way to 'win' the battle—the Union player must have a reason to control the lines of communication as well.*

*These two conditions work hand in hand for the Confederate player as well. Sure he can allocate **everything** to take Cemetery Hill, but failing to cut the roads too, because no effort was made, in combination with a failure to 'take that hill' spells a Union win.*

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## Historical Notes

As always the case, game designers find themselves with limited space to write down some thoughts about their subject. They have neither the room—nor the qualifications—to give a worthy history of the battle in question; books on the subjects usually abound, and never more than on this topic.

I have no interest in filling space with a 7<sup>th</sup> Grade Cliff Notes™ version of the battle, but I do have some commentary to give on some of the highly controversial points to explain my decisions on them. I hope you find them interesting and useful.

Those that feel “I already know everything worth knowing about Gettysburg” have a comforting simple view of life; I shall not bother disturbing them. They must understand far more than I do. I most certainly do not know all the answers... and barely remember the time when I was young enough to believe I did.

For those seeking additional understanding and know they ‘don’t have all the answers’ either, I present the following for contemplation and consideration.

*I remain, Sir, your Ob’t Svt,  
Dean*

### Lee and Longstreet

#### Longstreet at Gettysburg: The Third-Rail of the Civil War

After over 130 years of mud-slinging and name-calling, an analysis of the behavior of the senior Confederate command structure is not only difficult, but is subject to instant rejection.

To paraphrase Robert Krick, James Longstreet was assailed so violently that eventually any criticism of him was off limits. To blame “Old Pete” is subject to an accusation of *Lost Cause’ism* (this is the catch-all phrase for the effort to blame someone—anyone—other than Robert E. Lee for losing the war). Since this is such a contentious subject (as well as being so important), I decided to put my thoughts to paper so you can make an informed judgment of the assessments that underlie the ratings in the game.

Now keep in mind I write as a game designer, not a historian. A historian confronted with situation A at one time, and situation B at a later time, has the luxury of ignoring how to connect the two if no sourcing exists. As a game designer, I can’t afford those gaps. I must give the best conjecture I can muster based on the available research, even if doing this twists the gizzard of an academic historian. Here, I’ll tell you why I did what I did and what conclusions I reached.

Invariably, Lee-Longstreet discussions devolve into a recounting of who-slandered-who in a magazine article in 1879 and who made up some “facts” in a speech in 1881, etc. Tracking the back and forth after the war is not germane to my purpose. I merely need to determine *what* happened so I can design a game as accurately as possible. Laying blame is someone else’s job and concern.

That said, one post-war myth still must be dispelled: there was no “sunrise attack order” issued on the night of July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1863. Enough said on that; it didn’t happen. Focusing on an imaginary “sunrise attack order” merely distracts from the foot dragging that *did* occur.

For my purposes, I must endeavor to cut through the noise and determine the most accurate assessment of Longstreet’s leadership performance at Gettysburg.

In short, the question of Longstreet’s rapidity of action when given orders directly indicates the game’s leader values his counter should wear, so his “unit” behaves as it did on those fields.

### Timeline: When did all this happen?

The key to understanding what happened between Lee and Longstreet can be found in the simple timing of events. This isn’t as easy as one might think, given conflicting sources and the period’s non-standard time measurements. Still, the relative time of events can be determined to a great extent.

Let’s follow the story...

On the evening of July 1<sup>st</sup>, Longstreet joined Lee first on Herr Ridge and later moved forward with him to Seminary Ridge. The two discussed options for the coming day. Longstreet advocated maneuver, but not the tactical maneuver around the Round Tops that many suggest.

Instead, he preferred a much larger maneuver south and east, presumably to the Pipe Creek area along the Maryland-Pennsylvania border. This would, in theory, place the Confederate army between Meade’s Army of the Potomac (the main Federal field force in the Eastern Theater) and Washington.

Lee would have seen this option as impractical—mainly because of the Army of Northern Virginia’s lines of communication back over South Mountain and the enormous trains built up from the foraging effort in Pennsylvania. Shifting this logistical tail, possibly exposing it to Federal operations, would be a very risky and difficult undertaking. On top of this, he would have understood that the Army of the Potomac was most assuredly going to win any footrace to Pipe Creek.

Failing to convince Lee to follow his plan, Longstreet left at dark to meet the

van of his corps and bring it up for the potential battle the next day.

Longstreet linked up with his corps late that night at Cashtown after moving down the congested Chambersburg Pike. The head of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps column (Lafayette McLaws' Division) reached Marsh Creek (3 to 4 miles from Gettysburg) around midnight, followed by Hood's Division around 2:00 a.m. Both bedded down briefly. McLaws arrayed his troops off the road while Hood stayed right along it. McLaws was informed he would move out to finish the march at 4:00 a.m. and made arrangements to get the division ready to do so. Before McLaws set out, he received word that Hood (still on the road) would lead the line of march and that McLaws was to wait until Hood had passed. Presumably these orders were from Longstreet.

Hood's Division reached Seminary Ridge and filed south of the pike into the area just west of the orchard containing the army headquarters. McLaws followed Hood in and led his column almost directly up to the army HQ.

In the meantime, Lee awoke at 3:00 a.m. and dispatched three reconnaissance parties made up from his staff. Major Charles Venable was sent to examine the positions of Ewell's Corps to determine the possibilities there. Colonel Armistead Long (possibly with Brigadier General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, tagging along) was sent to look over the entire line's artillery positions. Most famously, Captain Samuel Johnston, engineer, was sent to explore the Federal left.

All three teams headed out by about 4:00 a.m.

How and why Johnston managed to miss the Federal troops in and around Little Round Top is not a concern here, but has been examined in Bill Hyde's article in *Gettysburg Magazine* #29 and also an earlier article by Dave

Powell. Interestingly, Mr. Hyde deals with the idea that Johnston reported the Federal position as arrayed **along** the Emmitsburg Road. Hyde maintains that Johnston did not state it was so. What is of importance to us is the time of his return. As near as can be determined, this was around 8:30 a.m.

Around that time, Lee, Longstreet, Hood, McLaws and Johnston were all together on Seminary Ridge. Leaning over a map, Lee indicated to McLaws where his division should go. Longstreet, meanwhile, paced back and forth nearby and then tried to point out a different orientation for McLaws, only to be overruled by Lee. Longstreet tersely denied McLaws permission, twice, to go recon his route (a wise move on Longstreet's part—the *last* thing he needed was to lose an experienced Major General to a Union cavalry patrol!). Lee asked McLaws if he thought he could move to the jump off point unseen by the enemy to which he answered he could. McLaws, it seemed, was under the mistaken assumption that Johnston had yet to conduct his recon and asked to accompany him.

Obviously, Lee violated the chain of command and some might suggest that this snub gives Longstreet license to react the way he did for the rest of the battle. Justified or not, what is important for my purposes is that for the next two days Longstreet did not *function* as even an average commander of his significance.

## Suggestion or Order?

Some maintain that Lee's statement to McLaws was a mere "suggestion" and not really an order. While, it is true that Lee's command style was one of delegation and trusting the execution details to his subordinates and staff, anyone with a military background understands that the commander's "wish," "desire," or "suggestion" **is** an order and must be treated as such. If the CO says "It would be nice if

the barracks were painted blue," you had better believe that blue paint will be slung quite soon. The dramatic "I **order** you to" do such and such statement is more a creature of Hollywood than anything else.

Furthermore, it is claimed that Lee had new corps commanders who were unfamiliar with such a delegated ordering style. Be that as it may, neither Longstreet nor his divisional commanders can plausibly be lumped in with the *new* guys.

I believe that Lee's "suggestion" was indeed an order and the subsequent movements of units after this was given show that *all concerned knew so at the time*—even Longstreet.

Colonel E.P. Alexander (temporary head of Longstreet's artillery) was given **definitive** orders to move the corps' artillery to support the attack at this time. Longstreet gave Alexander orders *in Lee's presence* to scout the area around the Peach Orchard and move his artillery over to the right. If Lee was *still there* when the orders were given, they must have been issued before Lee left to see Ewell around 9:00 a.m. Alexander isn't sure of the time, but he believes he moved his battalion of artillery to Pitzer's Schoolhouse and was waiting there for the corps before 11:00 a.m.

—Alexander, pg 235-236

Meanwhile, A.P. Hill sent orders to one of his divisions (R.H. Anderson arrayed along Herr Ridge) to move forward and relieve the battered division currently serving as the right flank of that corps on Seminary Ridge. Anderson was also given his attack orders for later in the day. Sources vary as to the time of these orders, but it seems the division might have started forward from the ridge as early as 7:00 a.m., but was still moving into position around 11:00 a.m. when its right brigade (Wilcox) ran into Berdan's Sharpshooters around Seminary Ridge. It is more likely that Anderson received orders later than 7:00 a.m., which places his orders in around the same 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. timeframe as the others.

McLaws' Division had to countermarch back down the Chambersburg Pike and then south along Herr Ridge Road to be in a position ready for the attack movement. This movement was followed by what was called a "long delay" stopping the column near the intersection with the Fairfield Road. This movement was **completed** on or before 10 a.m., meaning orders from Longstreet for McLaws to do this movement must have originated by 9 a.m. at the latest.

J. B. Polley, in his recollections in *Hood's Texas Brigade*, states that Hood's Division stopped behind Seminary Ridge for about an hour and a half. At which time, he reports the division moving about a mile or more to the "south-east" into a valley where there was "water and fuel" so they could make breakfast.

—Polley, pg 154

Obviously, the direction given is in error (else, they moved onto Cemetery Ridge which is rather doubtful). More likely they moved back over McPherson's Ridge into the valley of Willoughby Run (water available from the run, fuel from Herbst Woods). As is the case for McLaws, orders were given to Hood to shift his division to this staging area at around the same time as all the rest of this is happening. Orders, we can assume, originated from Longstreet.

Hood's movement here seems to have been 'cross-country' which makes sense if McLaws was also moving back and blocking the Chambersburg Pike at that same time.

Readers should take note that where the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps divisions ended up they could **either** begin a circuitous march to Warfield Ridge **or** launch a movement around the Federal left to interpose between Meade and Washington. Conjecture, to be sure, but the fact that they were sent there and then halted while Longstreet remained on Seminary Ridge to await Lee's return suggests Longstreet was

still hoping to convince Lee to change his mind.

In my view, all these supporting movements and orders confirm that Longstreet knew and understood that he had orders to move his corps to execute an attack in the Peach Orchard area that were received between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. A good estimate being 9:00 a.m., about the time Lee left his headquarters.

## Foot Dragging?

All that established, we must examine the time after the initial order's issue. Obviously, Longstreet set preliminary movements into motion (something some have accused him of not doing), but what happened then?

It seems that Longstreet, fresh from his first—and unspectacular—attempt at independent command (Suffolk) fancied himself a better general and strategist than Lee. Having argued the night before against any sort of attack, Longstreet was still questioning Lee's plan, and now his orders. He was placing himself not as a subordinate, but as a *second army commander* who was in a position to veto plans he did not approve.

Around 9:00 a.m. after issuing instructions to Longstreet and McLaws, Lee went to see Richard Ewell (commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps) and issue him the orders of how he was supposed to support the attack (actually, pretty much the same orders he gave Ewell the night before: he would demonstrate against the Union right when he heard Longstreet's attack against their left, and to translate that into a real attack if the opportunity presented itself). These orders dictated what Ewell was to do for the rest of the day. Ewell executed those orders as given.

When Lee returned to his HQ a little after 10:00 a.m., he found Longstreet still there. Alexander and the infantry divisions were—or had finished—

moving to their assembly areas. It would seem Longstreet had not issued the final execution orders.

"At 11:00 a.m., Lee finding his suggestions not being followed issued a direct order to get Longstreet to undertake the operation."

—Coddington, pg 378

Longstreet requested that he wait for Law's brigade (then an hour out) before moving and Lee agreed. Sometime between noon and 1 p.m. the corps finally began moving toward the assault positions along the Emmitsburg Road.

The elapsed time between the original order and the final beginning of execution is 3 to 4 hours. Lee authorized one hour of that to wait for Law. McLaws and Hood needed at least an hour to move to the line of departure for the flank march. If Longstreet is culpable for "foot dragging," it would seem that his contribution was between one and two hours.

On face value, this delay is *not* excessive and can be explained as the possible result of the sluggish movement of Anderson's Division forward to Seminary Ridge. However, Longstreet chose to move the divisions well in back of the line (and then stop them) **before** beginning the flank march (which was its own comedy of errors). Moving directly down the valley west of Seminary Ridge would have concealed the column (one of Lee's specifications) and allowed the troops to get to their jump off points for the assault. The time saved by the shorter march is important. Doing this, Longstreet's divisions would have been ready to assault between noon and 1:00 p.m. (even with the "foot dragging"), not at some point in the rear ready to start a flank march that would use up another 3 hours (counting the time then still needed to deploy from march column into the assault formations).

Again, Anderson's movement is a major limitation here. While Longstreet could have shot his divisions southward along the back of the ridge, he would



have done so in front of Anderson's advance (risking more confusion), marching back allowed Anderson to clear Herr Ridge and be "in front" of Longstreet's divisions as they proceeded south. However, the fact that Longstreet (trying to protect his reputation for the next 40 years) **never** made the case that he was waiting for Anderson to pass is telling.

So, while we have a relatively minor time delay (1-2 hours), we also have command choices (where to go, how to do it) that added another 3 hours. The combined delay of 4-5 hours (not counting the authorized hour to wait for Law's Brigade) is significant and must be laid at Longstreet's feet.

## Sloppy Execution— Two Days Running

Longstreet's performance, recounted above, was indeed slow (regardless of the exact reason). But relative speed is just one indicator of a leader's quality. Once a leader starts to follow orders, the choices he makes in how to accomplish the tasks assigned must also be integrated into any assessment. There are a number of choices from both the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of July that show Longstreet ineffectively executing (or possibly even actively shirking) his duties.

Longstreet's handling of Law's Brigade is flawed in a number of ways. Requesting permission to await Law's arrival is one thing, holding up the entire corps' movement is another. Law could have just as easily linked up with his division on the move to the attack position. Next is the decision to have Law on the furthest right of Hood's Division. Simply putting him on the right of the division instead of the left made their march all the further by forcing them to continue their march for the extra length of the entire division's column. Law's exhausted men were then eventually placed in the lead wave of the division, instead of in a supporting role (as the plan was modified when it

was discovered that the Peach Orchard was occupied by Union troops). None of these decisions show the mark of an experienced corps commander giving his chief's plan the maximum chance of success. Longstreet would have been well aware of the jaded condition of Law's men. He did not handle them in a way that showed that understanding. If Hood made these decisions (and he was experienced enough to consider these matters himself), Longstreet would have both known and was in a position to over-rule them to improve the corps' efficiency.

Apparently upset by Lee jumping the normal chain-of-command, to give instructions to McLaws, and still sulking about receiving a direct order to accomplish a task he did not feel was right, Longstreet made the unpardonable decision to place *authority* for the march of his corps in the hands of Captain Johnston (who was blissfully unaware of his new role as demi-corps commander). Longstreet chose to ride in the middle of the column at the head of Hood's Division. Longstreet's post-war excuse was that *since* McLaws was under Lee's orders, he (Longstreet) was no longer *responsible* for the division's movements (but that a mere captain was) defies belief. Johnston was sent as a guide, not as a commander. That somehow the experienced Longstreet was confused about the command relationship within his corps (something he should have been experienced enough to clarify with Lee before setting out) or (and seemingly more likely) the man was pouting after having his viewpoint turned down and his feelings bruised indicate neither a particularly excellent, nor energetic, leader.

The now leaderless corps marched to a small ridge just south of Black Horse Tavern and stopped, unable to determine how to proceed unobserved. Longstreet eventually rode up to the head of the column and ordered Hood to take the lead. When McLaws objected that he was

in front and wanted to maintain that honor, Longstreet allowed this, and the countermarch began—wasting more time.

Finally, approaching the Federal line at the Peach Orchard (sometime around 3:00 p.m.), Longstreet brusquely rode up to McLaws and again declined the division commander's request to make a reconnaissance. McLaws stated he didn't know what was to his front. Longstreet brushed this aside, saying there was nothing to his front and demanded to know how McLaws was going to deploy. McLaws laid out what he thought he would do (still feeling he was advancing blind). Longstreet responded, "That suits me," and rode off.

Longstreet's handling of the march, his ordering (multiple times) McLaws to blindly attack to his front, and his refusal to attempt to find out the real situation once they arrived, were all egregious errors. Then, after forcing McLaws to gear up for a frontal assault on the fly, he stopped him and told McLaws to wait for Hood.

Longstreet hurried Hood's men to the right of McLaws' position.

Once he extended his division to the right, Hood sent out scouts further beyond his flank. Finding nothing there, he requested permission *four times* to extend his flank further right. Longstreet denied all these requests citing Lee's orders. Hood finally gave up the argument and proceeded to attack "under protest." I'll leave interpretation of this suddenly narrow-minded viewpoint regarding *precisely* following the commanding general's orders to Robert Krick who concluded Longstreet was going to do Lee's plan *exactly* the way Lee wanted it so as to "teach the old man a lesson."

Around 4:00 p.m., Hood launched his assault and was promptly wounded. Evander Law, now division commander, was not aware of his increased responsibilities and allowed the division to disperse into multiple directions.

Longstreet, by this time, was over with McLaws holding him back from attacking until the situation was right. It is unknown if he was aware that Hood's Division was careening without a rudder. If he was, he made no effort to re-coordinate the attack. Eventually, around 5 o'clock, Longstreet unleashed McLaws' men.

Personally brave, Longstreet advanced partway with Kershaw's Brigade, to observe and be seen by the men. A corps commander's effect on a battle in progress is limited. He could do little besides direct reinforcements and provide a calm example. This he did.

Meanwhile, the troops and subordinate commanders under Hood and McLaws ripped the Federal lines to shreds and effectively destroyed one Federal corps and savaged divisions of two others.

Supporting this attack was Anderson's Division, 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps, next in line to the north. What—if any—coordination Longstreet did with Anderson (or A.P. Hill, Anderson's corps commander) is unknown. Possibly influencing this lack of coordination was Longstreet's cold relationship with Hill—they were barely on speaking terms (due to a spat regarding newspaper coverage during the Seven Days' Battles the year before). Longstreet did, however, order Wilcox's Brigade (under Anderson) to "incline to the right" so as to avoid observation by the enemy.

—Black to Bachelder,  
*Bachelder Papers*, pg 1241

On the night of July 2<sup>nd</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1863, Longstreet failed to report to Lee to discuss the day's fighting and get orders for the next day. As he customarily did report back, this was especially odd behavior. Nonetheless Lee's orders to resume the attack (at dawn) *were* issued and somehow made it to Longstreet's HQ. Alexander reported to HQ late that night and was told the attack would resume at dawn and to arrange his guns accordingly. He did the best he could in the dark. Ewell also received his instructions and heavily reinforced one of his

divisions with brigades from another. Ewell was ready to attack at dawn, but was pre-empted by a Federal counterattack.

Aware of his orders (yet later claiming he had none), Longstreet issued no instructions to bring Pickett's Division forward, but instead ordered McLaws' Division to disengage (which Longstreet later denied doing) and sent out scouts to determine a way around the Round Tops to strike at the Federal left.

There is speculation that Longstreet *did* bring Pickett forward in preparation to execute a flank march, but then had to march Pickett back to the launch point for the later attack—causing Pickett to complain about being "jerked around" (not his words...) that morning—but without Pickett's official report, and no mention of such a move by Longstreet, there is no way to ever determine if such a movement was ever made at all.

Lee rode up at dawn to determine why the attack had not begun and ordered Longstreet to cease preparations for a flanking maneuver and to prepare for the attack that would become known as Pickett's Charge.

Lee's plan for a coordinated pair of attacks on both flanks at dawn was willfully ignored. Longstreet enthusiasts would point at this, given what happened later in the day, as an example of Longstreet providing Lee with a better alternative. These same fans miss the point that Longstreet's loose cannon behavior eliminated the planned *coordinated* attacks on the Federal flanks and set the stage for the single-direction action that happened later.

Chastised for the second day in a row, Longstreet was put in charge of one of the most complex attacks ever executed by the Army of Northern Virginia and the *only* one attempted which crossed corps boundaries. He failed miserably. His failure would probably not have had any effect on

the eventual *outcome* of the attack. But it does offer more insight into the performance he rendered at the battle.

Coordination between the two corps was almost non-existent. The instructions to the two sets of artillery were different. No objection was made to the selection of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps units being used—those chosen were picked because they happened to be in that location and ignored other fresher units. Marching instructions were minimal and the right guides of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps only discovered that the infantry assault had begun when they noticed Pickett's left racing out ahead of them.

As far is known, no clear objective was passed down to lower commanders. The "clump of trees" being something Bachelder suggested to Alexander in the 1880's with an eye toward publicity and advertising. Alexander's confusion came about because Ziegler's Grove (probably the real target trees) had been felled and the copse—small trees at the time of the battle—had grown to full size. Regardless, both the "copse" and Ziegler's Grove aligned directly with Pickett's starting point and Cemetery Hill (key to the entire Union line). Some have speculated that the actual target of the attack was that hill.

But Longstreet's most egregious error was shifting the *responsibility* to Alexander for determining the effectiveness of the artillery barrage and the decision to send the infantry in. As with the day before, Longstreet shirked his responsibility as a corps commander and was willing to let someone else—both times of much lower rank—do the heavy lifting. This was unpardonable.

Finally, when the time came to order the attack, Longstreet perched on his fence rail merely nodded his head to Pickett and watched the attack go in. He, again, made no effort to coordinate movements or provide support from either infantry or artillery. Would it have changed the result? No. But it was his duty to do everything in his power to give it the best shot possible.

All these examples show a commander failing to effectively lead and control the magnificent troops under his command.

## An Assessment: Longstreet at Gettysburg

As Longstreet said himself in a letter to his uncle dated 24 July 1863:

*I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own.*

<http://www.gdg.org/Research/People/Longstreet/shlong1.html>

He certainly wasn't hesitant to express his views, but he did not execute orders as faithfully as if they were his own. This occurred on both of the days of Gettysburg where he and his troops were directly involved.

As his aide Colonel Moxley Sorrel stated in *At the Right Hand of Longstreet*, speaking of the boss he loved at Gettysburg:

*[He] failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield.*

—Sorrel, pg 167

Or the description by another staff member, Captain T.J. Goree in *Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree* (writing to his mother at a time before the Battle of Gettysburg):

*..he is some days very sociable and agreeable, then again for a few days he will confine himself mostly to his room or tent, without having much to say to anyone, and is as grim as you please, though, when this is the case, he is either not very well or*

*something has not gone to suit him. When anything has gone wrong, he does not say much, but merely looks grim.*

—Goree, pg 60, emphasis added

Only four days after the battle, 7 July 1863, McLaws wrote to his wife:

*General Longstreet is to blame for not reconnoitering the ground and for persisting in ordering the [2<sup>nd</sup> day's] assault when errors were discovered. During the engagement he was very excited, giving contrary orders to every one, and was exceedingly overbearing. I consider him a humbug, a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all chivalrous, exceedingly conceited, and totally selfish.*

—Oeffinger, *A Soldier's General: The Civil War Letters of Major General Lafayette McLaws*, pg 195-197

Some try to claim that McLaws wrote this to respond to potential public criticism of his own performance at the battle. They do, however, avoid telling us how a private letter to his wife only revealed after the war would accomplish this feat, or how it is McLaws thought to dwell on newspaper coverage three days after this historic blood-letting. In my humble opinion, he was venting his true feelings to the one person on earth he could trust to keep them private. The wounds were too open—too raw—for nuanced public relations.

Regardless of the stones cast upon him unfairly in later years (or for that matter, the half-truths he generated to defend himself), James Longstreet's command performance at Gettysburg was sluggish and lacking the "fire" of energetic execution (as Sorrel put it). Whether McLaws' assessment was correct about the man *over-all* is for others to debate, but in this designer's opinion he accurately described the officer at the helm of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps, Army of Northern Virginia on the three days that matter here.

I can only conclude that Longstreet

was a "below average commander" at Gettysburg and I have rated him as such. I believe this is a fair assessment given the available evidence of his performance.

## Robert E. Lee

A common reaction to my analysis of Longstreet's performance above is to think I'm making an apology for Lee's as army commander. The creation (or assailing) of The Marble Man is not germane to getting a proper perspective of the leadership of either man at this battle. Each had specific duties and performed them as the historical record indicates. As army commander, Lee is ultimately responsible for his subordinate's actions. He obviously understood this and did all he could to ensure that the battle's outcome was seen as "all my fault" in his statements at the time, his official report, and his offer to resign his command soon afterwards.

All that is true, but simply because Lee is responsible for the actions of his army does not mean that his subordinates did not screw-up or fail in their own responsibilities. Subordinates in military organizations fail all the time; commanders simply cannot make them mistake free. A good commander supervises within reason, corrects when and where he can, and provides an operational vision, allocation of assets, and order framework that allows the subordinate the best chance of success—even where actual success isn't physically possible, such as during Pickett's Charge.

My demonstration of Longstreet's shortcomings has nothing to do with excusing Lee from his command responsibilities. It determines Longstreet's abilities as shown in the battle so that the game can match them. No more, no less.

One feature that clouds assessing Lee at the battle is his command style. He was typically a hands-off commander who would give general instructions



and leave the execution and details to his subordinates. A forerunner of mission-type order systems as promoted by the German General Staff in the late 1800's, but without the highly trained professional staff officers and procedures needed to implement it successfully. In many cases, this ad hoc decentralized command structure accomplished what would not have been possible otherwise as competent leaders on the ground can react faster to changing circumstances, but the cost of such a command system is always an accepted level of imperfect coordination and a greater risk of the subordinates making mistaken choices.

Any commander's leadership style must strike a balance between centralized planning (generally sluggish and rigid, but with overall coordination maximized) and unbridled decentralization (rapid reaction to local circumstances but with inherent confusion and only that coordination allowed by happenstance). Lee was far closer to the latter than the former.

Furthermore, such decentralized execution requires both subordinate leaders of training and quality levels high enough to handle independent responsibilities and adequately trained staff support so that confusion in order formatting and wording is minimized. For the Germans, their highly trained staff officers ensured a kind of 'group think' that allowed them to *coordinate without communications* because one staff officer knew what his counterpart in the adjacent army would be advising his commander.

Nearly all of Lee's subordinates had training at both West Point (or other military academies, such as VMI) and junior to mid-level officer experiences in the pre-war army. They all had relatively extensive combat experience at multiple levels of command. While some might be in new—higher—positions, even they had experience in the field. While that

was the general rule for these men, Henry Heth was a notable exception.

True staff training had not yet been developed, so none of them had such a background. There was nothing Lee could have done to implement a true general staff of the sort the Germans developed—such a thing did not exist—nor could he draw on the aristocratic staff tradition available in Europe as a substitute.

Lee's staff was extremely limited and simply incapable of the job they were tasked to do. Lee can be personally faulted for not supplementing his tiny staff with additional experienced officers. Such an expansion was proposed, but was not done because he wanted to keep good officers in their combat commands.

So, what is my assessment of Lee at Gettysburg?

First, I believe it severely short-circuits analysis when one automatically assigns good and bad to a commander's style simply based on a battle's results. Lee's hands-off style is criticized because he lost, while Meade's 'running about like a wet hen' (to quote the Duke of Wellington) is lauded because he won. What would have been the opinion of historians had the Confederates won? That's right, Lee's approach would be written of as genius and Meade a goat. Obviously, this type of analysis simply cannot objectively examine the merits of either style.

Both styles have their place and the best commanders mix them as the situation requires. But such flexibility is limited by both the commander's personality and the army's character.

In this battle's case, Lee's hands-off style came back to bite him because one corps commander was incapable of functioning (Hill) and another was seemingly unwilling to function (Longstreet). Lee was unable or unwilling to drastically change his style when the crisis demanded

it. This became critical by the late afternoon of July 2<sup>nd</sup>. Taking a more direct charge of unfolding events such that Anderson deployed his whole strength or that Pender was able to launch was absolutely critical. Such actions on Lee's part would have brought Ewell into the battle earlier and perhaps allowed his army to carry Cemetery Hill.

Some might say he should have done this on the afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> day. I'd suggest he did what he could, but that the shortcomings that evening—critical as they look to us—were his first warnings that a change was needed. It's unfair to expect him to peer into the future and "just realize" that the command system he had used so successfully so far was failing *before* something did fail. But all the indications were there by the time he was embroiled in extended arguments with his sullen senior corps commander in the early hours of the 2<sup>nd</sup> day. By the time the assault in the afternoon began to fall apart, it may have been too late to recognize and implement the needed changes. That still gave him a window of some hours to determine that something was very wrong and to take steps to correct it.

He was doubly at fault in that he did not make this adaption in time for the planned early morning attack on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day. It was probably too late at that point for the change to have worked in terms of winning the battle, but a better performance that morning would have resulted from the then embarrassingly needed additional command and control.

Lee finally determined that a tighter hand on the reins was needed upon finding Longstreet preparing for an unauthorized flank march rather than the attack that was ordered early on July 3<sup>rd</sup>. At that point, Ewell's Corps was already embroiled in fighting. Even then—despite being active with Longstreet through the morning in establishing the assault plans—much was left unprepared and, obviously, the additional direct control was

nowhere near the level required to execute the replacement plan that eventually became the fiasco of Pickett's Charge.

So, you have an outstanding military commander (no argument there, he caused a larger army to withdraw from the gates of his capital, and went on to beat back all comers with an army on a shoestring) faced with an almost unthinkable problem: in the midst of what he knew was the battle that might decide the war, he needed to recognize that the situation required him to greatly change his heretofore successful style of command to one ill suited and unaccustomed to himself, his staff, and his subordinates. He needed to recognize this need, determine the best way to adjust, and implement that change in an effective manner in a matter of hours. And, he needed to do this knowing that his subordinates' freedom to act—a key reason for his success so far—would have to be sacrificed.

Personally, I do not know that such a pivot is possible at the head of an organization as large and complex as a 19<sup>th</sup> century army in the midst of a major battle.

Was Robert E. Lee responsible for the Army of Northern Virginia's failure at the Battle of Gettysburg? Yes, as commander, he was. Was it his fault? That's a very different question. Myriad failures generated the Confederate loss on that field. Robert E. Lee's fault is that he was unable to stop enough of them to allow his army to prevail overall.

The greatest failure crippling the Army of Northern Virginia was the effective collapse of the linkage between Lee's will and the actions of his divisions at the highest levels.

Hill's incapacitation should not have come as a great surprise; he was "ill" regularly. Lee would have known early on the morning of July 1<sup>st</sup> that Little Powell was unable to function properly. Egos aside, the solution

there is "easy" enough—put Hill on some sort of sick leave and place the corps temporarily under the ranking Major General. This would have been R.H. Anderson, unless even more disruption is accepted by reaching into other corps for officers. Anderson's performance was lackluster anyway, so it may not be possible to salvage Hill's Corps. Dorsey Pender was just promoted on May 27<sup>th</sup>, so he is not getting the job.

Longstreet's churlish behavior is puzzling and probably caught Lee by surprise. Replacing him on the field is not an option. Lee's only real choice would be to ride herd on the man throughout the battle to ensure that 1<sup>st</sup> Corps acted as desired. In this, Lee made a mistake. He chose to ride herd on Hill, instead, and was not willing to take the reins from him when Hill simply could not do the job. Longstreet was left to his own devices with disastrous results.

That was Lee's fault.

## R.H. Anderson, McLaws, and Hood's Divisional Arrivals

I used information in my Longstreet assessment that was unsnarled from a confused narrative regarding the arrival of the above divisions. The un-inquisitive might leap at the most common version available and not even notice the inconsistencies. The seemingly unimportant details of these movements helps to flesh out a better narrative of what happened on the morning of July 2<sup>nd</sup> and point to certain critical matters involving Longstreet and the orders he was given

Conventional wisdom — *statements repeated often enough that they become accepted as fact*— goes as follows:

- 1) Anderson arrived on the

1<sup>st</sup> and deployed on Knoxlyn Ridge to await morning.

- 2) On arrival, McLaws turned right on Herr Ridge and stopped his lead elements near the Fairfield Road.
- 3) Hood, arriving next, also turned right on the Herr Ridge road stopping north of McLaws.

All three are wrong.

First, Anderson's bivouac site.

*Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which **had just been vacated** by Pender's Division, and to place one brigade and a battery of artillery a mile or more on the right of the line, in a direction at right angles with it and facing to the right.*

- R.H. Anderson's *OR Report* vol 27 part 2 [emphasis added]

Anderson arrived in the late afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup>. The only location that **had just been vacated** by Pender at that time was Herr Ridge. Pender's Division *did* originally deploy on Knoxlyn Ridge, but moved forward to Herr Ridge much earlier in the day before being stopped by a direct order from A.P. Hill. Pender stayed on Herr Ridge until the afternoon assault began. To Anderson's eyes, the only place of note regarding Pender was Herr Ridge.

Harry Pfanz came to this same conclusion in his monumental study of the 2<sup>nd</sup> day:

*When Anderson's Division reached the approaches to Gettysburg, Hill ordered Anderson to deploy four of his brigades on Herr Ridge. Pender's Division had vacated this high ground a short time before when Hill sent it forward into the attack.*

- Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, pg 21

So what is the origin of the idea that Anderson spent the night on Knoxlyn Ridge? First, we have two reports of his distance to the rear:

[Anderson's Division was] some 2 miles to the rear of the battleground. — A.P. Hill's OR Report

...about 2 or 3 miles from Gettysburg, where they remained until next morning... — A.R. Wright's OR Report

Read the right way and from the right starting point both of these reports could be interpreted to mean Knoxlyn Ridge. Herr Ridge is a little less than 2 miles from Gettysburg's town square. Knoxlyn Ridge is around 3 miles from the same place. Measuring from something like McPherson's Ridge or the "edge" of Gettysburg changes the meaning completely. Both of these reports are ambiguous because of the unexplained starting point.

Furthermore, Bachelder placed the division on Knoxlyn Ridge on his troop movement maps. I believe this was the result of applying Anderson's "just vacated" notation but not ascribing the full meaning to the "just" part of that statement.

Placing Anderson on Herr Ridge has serious ramifications regarding the arrival of the two divisions of 1st Corps.

As for McLaws' approach march, we have this sort of confusion coming from historians:

...The division commander [McLaws] had ridden in advance of his troops, who were halted in a lengthy column along the Chambersburg Pike.

...With the instructions given, McLaws returned to his command, which he had posted along Herr Ridge, roughly a mile and a half west of Seminary Ridge.

...The time was approximately nine o'clock when McLaws headed back to start his division for Herr Ridge. —All of these on pg 264 of General James Longstreet by Jeffery Wert, in the order given above [emphasis added]

But a very clear statement coming from the division commander himself:

The march was continued at a very early hour, and my command reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg early in the morning. Just after I arrived General Lee sent for me—as the head of my column was halted within a hundred yards of where he was—and I went at once and reported. —Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," SHSP vol 7 pg 68 [emphasis added]

Since before McLaws' Division arrived, Lee was on or near the Seminary grounds on Seminary Ridge. McLaws is therefore stating that the van of his division stopped on the Chambersburg Pike just shy of the army HQ on the west side of Seminary Ridge. Likewise, there is only one "hill overlooking Gettysburg" in the direction these troops are arriving from, and that is Seminary Ridge.

Contradicting this is:

At the head of McLaws' Division I arrived in front of Gettysburg, about one half hour after sunrise on the morning of 2d of July 1863. We debouched from the main road by a by-road that traversed an open common for a few hundred yards, and there halted, the head of the column having reached the mouth of a lane which the road entered at Hoss' [sic, Haas] house. —Joseph Kershaw, letter to Bachelder, 20 March 1876 Bachelder pg 453

But note that Kershaw (commander of McLaws' lead brigade) adds no information between arriving in front of Gettysburg and debouching from the main road. He does not state where "in front of Gettysburg" he arrived, nor does he include the direction of the debouchment. This was also written 13 years after the battle without the assistance of his own official report.

He did say in his official report:

We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg, with only a slight detention from the trains in the way, and moved to the right of Third Corps, and were halted until about noon. —Joseph Kershaw, OR Report

So, here he arrives specifically at "the hill overlooking Gettysburg" (again, that is Seminary Ridge). The rather cribbed sentence construction of the linking "ands" leads me to believe he was actually saying he 1) arrived at the hill overlooking Gettysburg, then 2) moved to the right of Third Corps and then 3) halted until about noon. In other words, he was describing three sequential activities.

A bit of indirect evidence that McLaws was accurate comes from the above discussion of Anderson's location. Having McLaws move in column down Herr Ridge right after dawn would commingle the two divisions in a way that would cause great confusion. Anderson would not have left the ridge until several hours after McLaws arrived. No experienced divisional

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commander would have set his division on top of another in so small an area. The risk would be too great. Additionally, no one in either division reported the two divisions having to work *through* each other that morning. Furthermore, McLaws was following orders to report directly to Longstreet. No one suggested—or ordered him—to put his division in battle-line a couple of miles to the rear.

So, we must have McLaws moving to Seminary Ridge first and later moving to Herr Ridge to start the flank march.

Lastly, the matter of Hood coming on to Herr Ridge closer to the Chambersburg Pike than McLaws.

The conventional wisdom here is that McLaws arrived and marched down Herr Ridge and Hood followed him so that he filled in the area between the rear of McLaws and the pike. This is demonstrably wrong. It is quite clear from a number of reports that Hood actually marched toward Gettysburg **first** that morning. It is true that McLaws led the march from Chambersburg, but the divisional march order was changed in the pre-dawn hours such that Hood was in front. If the conventional wisdom were correct, Hood would have been the division furthest south on that ridge.

Worse than the problem with McLaws and Anderson mixing on Herr Ridge, to follow the convoluted logic of the conventional wisdom, you have Hood arriving and stopping at the northern end of Herr Ridge (on top of part of Anderson) and then McLaws marching through the middle of **both** of these divisions to occupy the southern part of the ridge. Now you have **three** divisions piled on top of each other in a small space.

Polley's description above placing Hood in the field just south of the Chambersburg Pike on the west side of Seminary Ridge and subsequent

movement (about an hour and a half later) cross-country about a mile or so to a valley with fuel and water works well. McLaws would have had to countermarch back up the pike to turn down Herr Ridge while Hood moved cross-country just south of the pike to occupy the area just west of Willoughby Run near Herbst Woods. All of this happens while Anderson moves off Herr Ridge to the southeast to relieve Heth's Division. This keeps all three divisions from mixing.

*... Hood's Division followed its commander toward Gettysburg by way of the Chambersburg Pike and filed into the fields west of Seminary Ridge, where its men stacked arms and fell out to rest. McLaws' Division followed Hood's, and its van got as close as a hundred yards to General Lee's observation point before it halted.*

— Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, pg 110

I believe Pfanz has the situation here described accurately. Both Hood and McLaws were under orders to report to Longstreet as quickly as feasible. Neither received any orders that morning to park on a ridge several miles away. The divisions would have behaved as Pfanz notes.

That said, it requires some conjecture to fill in the blanks regarding the movement from these initial locations to the Herr Ridge jump off points at mid-day. Other than Polley, **no one** recorded any "preparatory" marching. However, given the known locations, there is only one way to reconcile the matter. That is what I have outlined earlier. These movements, and their sequencing, is critical to understanding when Longstreet received his orders and what he did with his corps afterwards.



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## Richard Ewell

Second only to Longstreet in the post-war carnival of blame is Richard S. Ewell, the one-legged commander of 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps.

Here again, conventional wisdom wreaks havoc and prevents many readers from seeing through its murk. As conventional wisdom would have it, a newly married, recently crippled, Richard Ewell took an unsteady command of Jackson's old corps and was indecisive at best. The assumption being he lost "something" of his character and leadership with that leg and marriage, becoming much more tentative in his decisions.

Upon taking the town of Gettysburg, he was supposedly gripped both by this indecision and an order from Lee to "avoid a general engagement." Lastly, Lee's use of the phrase "if possible" and "if practicable" in his orders to take Cemetery Hill the first night was "unfamiliar" to this new corps commander who was so used to Jackson's authoritarian methods and orders.

The result, so goes conventional wisdom, is that he could not decide what to do and ended up failing to decide what is obvious in hindsight—and the only chance to take Cemetery Hill faded away.

When I first began this project, I had no issues with that particular conventional storyline (as opposed to Longstreet and Lee, where the activities of each officer seemed at odds with conventional assessments). Ewell and his corps seemed passive and of limited import compared to the more interesting tales of the battle involving the fighting on, and south of, Cemetery Ridge into the Round Tops. To be honest, few give the actions around Culp's Hill more than a passing look. I know I did not.

That changed rapidly. As a friend stated: "Ewell becomes the one-eyed man in a room full of blind men."

Let's look at what actually happened.

First, the brand new “indecisive” Ewell used his bold decisions and daring to win the Second Battle of Winchester in his first days as a corps commander. The battle has been called “one of the most perfect pieces of work the Army of Northern Virginia ever did” (Maj. Robert Stites). If even partially true, this is high praise indeed.

With an order in his pocket from Lee telling him to “avoid a general engagement” and word from A.P. Hill regarding a concentration at Gettysburg, Ewell decided on the morning of 1 July 1863 to turn his corps toward Gettysburg—instead of the safe bet, Cashtown, arguably Lee's preferred choice.

Once on the ground, he observed the positions of the Union defense lines and A.P. Hill's troops, correctly identified the opportunity, ignored the “no general engagement” restriction and immediately sent orders to both Rodes and Early on his own initiative to attack. His corps proceeded to be the key element of the immensely successful Confederate attack that day, where four divisions of the Rebel army virtually destroyed two Union corps (one of which being arguably the Army of the Potomac's finest, while the other is typically written off as its worst).

Taking the town, both his divisional commanders expressed the viewpoint (which many believe was in error) that their troops were in no condition to continue the assault onto Cemetery Hill *without* additional support. These were both very aggressive officers; if they had reason to believe going on without support was impossible, it carried great weight. Ewell decided on their best counsel to stop long enough to re-organize.

Meanwhile, A.P. Hill convinced Lee that his corps was incapable of additional combat that day. Lee summoned a staff officer, Major

Walter Taylor, to go to General Ewell and tell him “it was only necessary to press ‘those people’ in order to secure the possession of the heights south of town” with an admonition to do so “if practicable”. Taylor rode off to find Ewell in the town square (probably right around 5:00 p.m.), delivered the order and believed it to be understood and that it would be executed.

Taylor delivered Lee's order just before Early and Rodes arrived to discuss the situation with Ewell (and convince him they needed support to accomplish anything). Early suggested Ewell request help from Lee; Ewell liked the idea. With the corps leader endorsing the idea to stop, reform, and then attack when support was provided, Rodes rode back to his division and found them in the process of stepping off on their own hook to attack the hill. He stopped them in their tracks. Two of his brigade commanders, O'Neal (who wanted to redeem himself for his earlier mistakes) and Doles (who had helped rip apart 11<sup>th</sup> Corps with little loss) were aghast and vehemently argued the case to continue. The increasingly ill Rodes would not allow them.

Ewell sent an aide (James P. Smith) to Lee requesting the desired support. Lee told Smith he would give what support he could and issued orders for Hill's artillery to deploy on Seminary Ridge in order to fire upon Cemetery Hill. These orders were not implemented by Lee's chief of artillery William Pendleton (who, not surprisingly, joined Early after the war in the witch-hunt to find someone *else* to blame for the loss). Pendleton placed the artillery, in park, behind Seminary Ridge and they were not deployed pursuant to Lee's orders that day.

Lee then told Smith essentially the same order he sent to Ewell with Major Taylor: “to take Cemetery Hill if it were possible”. Smith returned to Ewell with these orders.

In both cases, described in great detail later by both Taylor and Smith, the words “if practicable” or “if possible” are used **but not** the conventionally attributed admonition to “avoid a general engagement”.

The wording choices here are important.

The first one (practicable or possible) is also one of the pillars upon which the “indecisive” and “not used to Lee's style” arguments rest. The phrase is used to suggest that the order was optional, dependent upon the result of some sort of reflection on its possibility. That interpretation rests on removing the phrase from its historical context. It was then a common condition applied to discussions among gentlemen recognizing respect for the other's status. It was not unusual in Lee's orders any more than the common—subordinating—valedictions used in letters of the time.

Confusing the issue even more is the insertion of “avoiding a general engagement” into the argument. Neither man delivering these orders stated that this phrase was part of the message relayed to Ewell.

It's origin? One phrase contained in R.E. Lee's official after action report. The conventional wisdom goes that Ewell was throttled and confused by that requirement. The argument is used (along with ‘if practicable’) to also illustrate the conventional image of a confused, indecisive, and ‘in a mental fog’ Lee.

The problem is that these orders **did not contain** this warning.

It **was** in the orders Ewell had earlier that morning. Orders that Ewell—correctly—**ignored** when he saw the incredible opportunity presenting itself from Oak Hill. That somehow he managed to *ignore that restriction* (demonstrably in his hands) and *opened a general engagement* at 2:00 p.m. or so, but was completely stymied by the same idea (which evidence indicates was not reiterated) at 5:00 p.m. is illogical.

Hanging their opinion strictly on one phrase in Lee's report, historians ignore the personal accounts of the two men who actually carried the orders.

"Why is it, then, in Lee's report?" they'll say. Lee, and his military secretary Charles Marshall, carefully crafted the report to protect his subordinates from public blame for the defeat. Lee struck out entire sections Marshall felt were vital to the understanding of the battle (Pickett's entire official report was ordered destroyed). Every word was chosen with great deliberation. Lee attempted to ensure that he alone was deemed at fault.

The assignment of the phrase into those later orders is not supported by the evidence and ridiculous in light of the day's events. To state that he first committed to a general engagement, but was then suddenly frozen by that earlier admonition **after** a major victory is laughable. His *other* actions that day are at odds with the conventional wisdom, but I'm not expecting any 'serious historian' to agree—yet oddly, they are not troubled by the contradictory bigger picture.

Still, regardless of his earlier boldness and in spite of two orders to do so, it is also true that Ewell did not actually attack.

One can only speculate that the advice of his generals, his own appreciation of the need for support, and his direct observation of the enemy was enough to convince a veteran combat leader that his command could not precede at that time. In the game, I believe we can discover whether or not his decision was the right one, but we also have to assume he made *the best decision he could* given the available information and his own experience.

That night's tale of 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps command breakdowns continued after the decision to not storm

Cemetery Hill. Lee met with Ewell and his division commanders around 6:30 p.m. to discuss the corps' options. Lee did not repeat his order regarding the capture of Cemetery Hill (they must have convinced him, too, that it was not possible), but he did instruct them to capture Culp's Hill with Johnson's newly arriving division. Ewell issued orders to Johnson to do so.

Three events conspired to make that operation misfire, too.

First, upon returning to his headquarters, Lee changed his mind and sent Ewell orders to prepare to pull his corps back to the west to be in line with the rest of the army on Seminary Ridge. Ewell went to army headquarters to argue the idea and Lee reversed himself countermanding the second set of orders.

Second, Ewell's orders to Johnson specified to attack the hill only if the hill was "unoccupied." Johnson, who was apparently unaware that Ewell's staff had already done a recon and found it deserted, sent out his own recon. It found a few troops there (the 7<sup>th</sup> Indiana Regiment and the crippled remains of the Iron Brigade), so it was decidedly "occupied."

This led to the third problem. On their way back, Johnson's recon team managed to capture a dispatch rider with an order from Slocum to Sykes detailing the movements for the Union 5<sup>th</sup> Corps. This corps was stopped for the night a few miles from Ewell's left flank. With a Union force presumably marching right into his flank in a few hours (as well as another unaccounted corps, the 12<sup>th</sup>, known to be somewhere on the field), Ewell could be risking the entire army's flank if he pressed on to the south without strongly guarding that approach route. There was only one brigade of Early's Division facing that way. Early reinforced it with another brigade

and Ewell must have also felt that holding Johnson in his current position (just south of the Hanover Road) would be necessary.

That being the state of affairs, he made two decisions students of the battle will forever question. First, he called off the attack on Cemetery Hill (to which Lee belatedly concurred). Second, he held Johnson's Division in place to guard against the possibility of a Union attack in the morning. Without hindsight, both are arguably reasonable and prudent.

Whether the hyper-aggressive Jackson would have done so in Ewell's place is irrelevant (except that in a similar condition at Chancellorsville, Jackson *did* halt an advance to reform his troops). What we do know is that since the morning of July 1<sup>st</sup>, Ewell made four key decisions: he turned toward Gettysburg rather than continue on to Cashtown, he attacked with Rodes and Early, he decided not to attack Cemetery Hill, and held Johnson back from moving up onto Culp's Hill.

No one with the benefit of hindsight can excuse the latter two decisions. However, regarding mistakes at the time, Lee reportedly once said "Young man, why did you not tell me at the time? After the battle, even a man as dull as I can see what I *should* have done."

The two earlier decisions were not only the correct ones, but each was the aggressive choice and was made *rapidly*. They *created* the impressive Confederate victory on the battle's first day.

So, what became of Ewell in the remaining two days of the battle?

The next morning he again convinced Lee that it was not in the army's best interest to maneuver his corps out of its position on the left flank. He then obtained orders



(around 9:00 a.m.) that he followed the rest of the day with his corps. After executing the required “demonstration” (by artillery fires), he ordered his corps to attack when the opportunity seemed available. His troops briefly captured East Cemetery Hill and also lodged a threat to the Baltimore Pike. The latter forced the Federals to plan a counterattack to press it back the next morning.

On that day, he is at fault for not making Early attack with more of his division. Also, Rodes (laid up sick in Gettysburg) did not prepare his division properly. It took so long to deploy out of the town that it could not attack. Arguably, both were the purview of the division, not corps commander, but like Longstreet, Ewell is ultimately responsible for what his corps does (or does not) do. He also did not find useful employment for two of his artillery battalions (Carter and Nelson), but as players will discover in the game, there just isn’t a great deal of good ground for artillery in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps sector. He did, however, follow his orders that day *as issued* and each of his division commanders attempted to execute those orders. This was not the case in *either* of the other two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the night of the July 2<sup>nd</sup>, Ewell was issued orders to attack the next dawn. He prepared that night by heavily reinforcing Johnson’s Division. He also shifted both of the ‘forgotten’ artillery battalions to more useful locations. The corps was preparing to attack when the Union attack preempted it. The battle raged there for a few hours, during which Longstreet was reigned back in for not following his orders. This set the stage for the fiasco that was Pickett’s Charge.

In the end, except for the pair of decisions on July 1<sup>st</sup> (which may have been the best choices at the time) and a failure to ensure Rodes and Early executed their attacks on July 2<sup>nd</sup> in concert with the forces available, Richard Ewell did his job within reason and even with a bit of independent flair on the first day.

## A Tale of Two Ammo Dumps

In beginning work on this game, I started digging into the known information on the artillery ammunition reserves of both armies. This was primarily done to fulfill the series’ needs for accurate artillery ammunition data. I figured that this would be a relatively easy job, especially when compared to the detective work needed for **None but Heroes**. Heck, it’s Gettysburg, one of the most documented battles in history. Surely in the reams of information collected on every aspect of this critical battle, someone must have taken an in-depth look at the supply of ammunition to the big guns.

Not so, in fact the topic required the peeling back of many layers of the historical onion... and not a little educated guess work.

Most games have always assumed that the Union army was swimming in ammunition while the Confederates had a modest but reasonable stock pile. The result was that while the Confederates might have to pay passing attention to ammunition, the Union was pretty much able to ignore the issue entirely. This, of course, colored the behavior of players in all those games.

At odds with this “standard wargame” feel is the heated arguments between Henry Hunt and Winfield Hancock regarding the conservation of ammunition and the general impression that batteries were running very low by the third day.

This would never be the case in a game, as few of them ever got as far as the third day (the Confederates generally shoot their bolt on the second and the players pack it in afterwards).

However, the Army Artillery Reserve Ammunition train (Hunt’s private stash) was depleted and sent back to the rear to refill on July 3<sup>rd</sup>.

These facts lead me to take a closer look as to what was happening as it was obvious that games were not giving the players the historical feel.

Hunt’s own report is the source of the confusion as he (correctly) relates that of the 270 rounds available per gun in the army, about 100 were fired (only 37% of the total in the largest battle ever to occur on North American soil). He also relates that there was

...a fear that the ammunition would give out. This fear was caused by the large and unreasonable demands made by corps commanders *who had left their own trains or a portion of them behind*, contrary to the orders of the commanding general. [Emphasis added]

The Army Artillery Reserve train of 70 wagons led to the field by Lt. Cornelius Gillett who was diligent enough to make a full report of his activities relates that 7,325 rounds of the 19,189 he issued at the battle went to 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Corps (the remainder were issued to the guns of the Artillery Reserve).

These two bits of evidence waved the red flag in front of me as to what might be going on. Who left their wagons behind, and what else was going on here?

First, we have Gillett going to refill the reserve wagons on the 3<sup>rd</sup>. That means there was a major accumulation of ammunition some distance behind the battle. This turns out to be Westminster, MD some 15 miles SE of Gettysburg. Westminster was turned into the army’s main supply hub and the terminus of the railroad leading to it. The army’s Supply Train parked there and with it much of the ammunition reserve (everything beyond what the corps wagons carried and Gillett’s wagons took to the battle).

Second, we have the three corps who needed to replenish their own reserves. The first two were easy. Hancock (2<sup>nd</sup>

Corps) reports that to move faster to the field he only brought half of his trains. Sickles (3<sup>rd</sup> Corps) specifically decided to send his trains to Westminster and did not bring any to the field.

But what of 11<sup>th</sup> Corps? Here the plot thickens. Major Osborn (11<sup>th</sup> Corps Artillery Commander) did bring his trains, but relates that his stock was depleted, not by his own guns, but by issuing ammunition to 1<sup>st</sup> Corps “who were without their trains.”

While I have not been able to find a “smoking gun” relating to the movements of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Artillery Reserve train, I believe it is reasonable to assume that in the movement to get to the field on the morning of the 1<sup>st</sup>, Reynolds either left his train behind at Emmitsburg (in the loving hands of Dan Sickles, who then presumably sent it to Westminster with his own ammunition), or sent it to Westminster himself following the instructions from Army HQ to send all the baggage trains to that location. Either way, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps arrived at the scene without additional ammunition for its batteries in the critical first hours of the battle.

Splitting the 270 rounds per gun into the 120 typically with the gun and its caissons (12 ldr) and what Cole (*Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg*) relates as the “bulk of the army’s ammunition” at Westminster. If we assume “bulk” is at least 51%, then that equates to 137 rounds per gun. This leaves only 13 rounds per gun for the corps trains (given that the “lost” corps trains count toward the 51%, this is 13 rounds for all the guns on the field, not just the corps with their wagons).

The result is slim and spotty ammunition reserves that may have proven fatal had not Hunt’s reserve been available. As it was, the army was forced to ration fires on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, leading to the extended lull before the opening fires of the afternoon Confederate assault.

And what of the Confederates? Everyone recognizes that the Army of Northern Virginia was nowhere near as well supplied as the Union, so games showed them with some smaller number than the extreme over-abundance given the Union.

As usual, Confederate information is sketchier. Alexander estimates that each gun had 100 rounds in its chests and another 100 in the trains. Given the poor quality of Confederate ammunition, this equates to a smaller number of actual fire-able rounds. Furthermore, an actual inventory of the Army’s Ammunition Reserve has recently been discovered from 29 June 1863 that shows the ANVa trains only had enough ammunition to resupply **one** artillery battalion (typically 4 batteries). This is an extremely small amount for an army of this size. The remainder was kept in the corps reserve trains.

Looking deeper, I found that not only were the amounts extremely small, but the army and corps trains were slow in getting to the battle and established in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps hospital complex west of Marsh Creek (in other words, off map). Some trains moved to the area near Black Horse Tavern to support the action on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day, but even they were some distance away from the actual battle zone (Union trains, on the other hand, were consolidated into an enormous “Grand Park” near the Granite Schoolhouse directly in the rear of the fish-hook line).

The result is that Confederate batteries were essentially forced to use what they had on-hand. This led to another feature of the battle that looks very odd until the paucity of ammunition is considered. On all days of the battle, you can see entire Confederate artillery battalions left in the rear taking no part, at all, in the fight. Examples include both Heth and Pender’s divisional artillery (which pretty much spent July 1<sup>st</sup> twiddling their thumbs around Marsh Creek) and the Washington Artillery Battalion which spent most of July 2<sup>nd</sup> around Willoughby Run.

These *units* were being used as ammunition reserves. Should a battalion at the front become depleted, these battalions were available to fill in the gap while the empties went to the rear. Effectively, the army saw the battalions as “expended” when they were used up. Some could be replenished from corps stocks (such as what Alexander accomplished between July 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>), but when that ammo was gone, it was over. Literally, Longstreet’s assault on July 3<sup>rd</sup> was the last gasp the army had at Gettysburg. There wasn’t enough left to “try again” and still support the retreat back to Virginia.

## Designer’s Notes

I’ll refrain from the obligatory “why a new Gettysburg game?” section and merely jot up my thoughts about the design issues I worked on. For the grognard, those sections should answer the “why” question. I figure it’s ‘all new’ to the uninitiated, so I’m covered at both ends. For the great middle, enjoy!

## The Morning of July 1st

Of repeated concern in testing was the exact manner in which the morning’s initial battle was to take place. Being a meeting engagement, timing was—and is—critical. Even a modest force arriving at the scene of the action mere turns out of sequence could lead to repercussions from which a side might never recover. Furthermore, the wildly changing balance of forces led players to very clear decisions on what they would do. (*We did this in testing, so you wouldn’t have to!*)

## Timing

Just getting units to the field (for the Union, especially) required the coordination of a NASA launch. I deliberately chose to avoid “design

for effect” here (which would simply place units along the road at a point where X turns later they would, by normal movement, end up in the fight at the right time).

Instead, I wanted to show things like the details of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps approach march that are typically glossed over. I knew that Cutler had left camp (south of Marsh Creek) and was moving north of the Iron Brigade’s camps at 8:30 a.m., that they would march to the Peach Orchard road junction to await orders while Reynolds went forward to investigate the situation. Furthermore, a gap developed between Cutler and the Iron Brigade as the latter took until around 9:00 a.m. to break camp and get on the road (letting them catch up was one reason put forward for the division’s Peach Orchard halt). Following those events worked well enough, *except* that the units literally double-timed from the halt locations to the battle. The time from when Reynolds’ release until they got to the location for the first infantry fire exchange was just too short. Also, Reynolds’ entire ride forward, visit with Buford, and return happened very rapidly (too rapidly to do it literally in the game). Lastly, this is one of three instances I found where the normal workings of the Command System would take too long to get the job done.

I addressed the “march speed” issue with the *Double Quick* rule, Reynolds with the OOA’s ‘transporter’ functions, and the command issue with the instant order to Wadsworth. There is a price to be paid in rules weight, but I feel the pay-off in seeing what actually happened is worth it this time.

Timing was critical for the arrival of the two Union infantry brigades and some variability between them makes things interesting. Cutler **had** to be in position in time for the 1<sup>st</sup> shot (roughly 10:15 a.m.) or the cavalry would not be able to withstand the Rebel attack long enough to cover

Seminary Ridge. Being late was not an option here (as will become more apparent when we look at the *Carrots* section). The Iron Brigade’s breaking camp has a bit more variability and this adds significant tension to the defense and gives the Confederates some useful goals as we shall soon see.

One thing that took time to get my arms around was the fact the cavalry *didn’t* fight a tooth and nail action with the Confederate advance (I’d like to, again, thank *The Killer Angels* clouding the image for me).

Games typically show the cavalry getting shredded by massed infantry attacks **and** leveling entire regiments of Rebs using their ‘carbine buzz-saws’. Neither of these is accurate (the real action accounted for 2 SPs of loss on each side). Instead, the cavalry fight was limited to the important functions of *slowing* the Rebel march (from Marsh Creek) and (critically) *forcing* *Heth* to *deploy*. Restricting Confederate use of Column formation forward of Herr Ridge and forcing them to deploy on line with **both** brigades before advancing show the important effects of the cavalry fight.

Without them, the Confederates a-historically ‘ignore’ the cavalry screen and bludgeon right into the cavalry’s main defensive line. That’s a situation Heth was in no position to offer—and Buford could not afford to try to resist. Makes for nice novels and movies, though.

Once Heth begins his advance, the two Zeroes (Davis and Archer) made the remaining advance happen at the right speed (averaging 4 MPs per turn) so they would get to where they needed to be on time to meet the Union infantry (with a bit of variability in both directions to make things interesting).

## Carrots

Once the basic timing was under control, it rapidly became apparent in testing that the situation rode on a knife-edge. When all of Wadsworth’s Division was up, Archer and Davis really must pull back to Herr Ridge and await the rest of the army (as they eventually did historically). Players quickly began to decide to avoid a fight until then, anyway, to the point of not seeing a reason to attack at all. Meanwhile, the Union had absolutely no interest in holding the ridges forward of town—the player knew he’d eventually be back on Cemetery Hill and figured he’d do better with an intact 1<sup>st</sup> Corps than not. Both players were seemingly coming to the joint conclusion that they’d skip any morning fight and agree to start the battle “some time this afternoon” back on Cemetery Hill.

The Confederates needed a reason to attack and the Federals needed a reason to defend.

Typically, this is handled (at least from the Confederate side... I’m not sure designers have really given the Union player much of any reason to defend forward) by letting all of Heth and the rest of Hill’s Corps slip the reins and go berserk. Jerry Axel dubbed this effect “Panzergruppe Hill.” Obviously, this “fixes” one game design problem by ditching historical reality and taking a quick run into fantasy. Players deserve better than that.

Instead, I chose to have Cutler show up pretty much right on time, but allowed some possible delay to affect the arrival of the Iron Brigade. What this—combined with the variations in the speed of Heth’s Zeroes—does is Cutler *may* have a few turns to deal with Heth alone before being fully supported. That gives Davis and Archer a brief window of opportunity to beat Cutler up a little before being scared off by ‘them Black Hatted Fellers’.



Damaging half of Wadsworth's Division has great value to the Confederates, so they have a good reason to attack early on. Giving the Federals a reason to defend needed its own carrot.

Reynolds and Buford chose the ground northwest of town to defend specifically so they could fall back before needing to defend the key high ground of Cemetery Hill. Unlike the game player, they did not have a printed order of arrival in front of them and dozens of histories to look at to know when reinforcements would arrive. They needed to hold for as long as possible—and *hopefully* that would be long enough. You need to sweat that time, just like they did.

I gave the Federals two reasons to “hold forward”. First, keeping the Hill's Corps HQ off the top of West McPherson's Ridge severely constrains Hill's freedom of action (limiting any wide maneuvers the player might want to pull off). Second, allowing the Rebels to make lodgments on the top of Seminary Ridge too early affects Lee's “attitude” about the fight and generates a “momentum of victory”. Good reasons to hold on for dear life.

## Order Short-Circuits

I mentioned above that the order from Reynolds to Wadsworth could not follow the normal order process due to the time involved. This situation also occurs with Lee in his orders to Hill's Corps in the afternoon, and then Ewell's order to Rodes. All of these could not follow the normal order process as that would take too long... and all of them were the result of very special circumstances. These circumstances are also very similar to one another.

Reynolds left Wadsworth to see what the situation was, but everyone involved knew that orders were

coming to move forward into the fight (the question being where to go, not if they would). By the time Reynolds came back and sent his staff to drop fence rails, the division was already ready to go and only needed to hear the word. They had gotten ready for the order long before it came.

While Lee was observing the field and getting a feel for the situation, Heth asked, at least twice, if he could attack. Upon seeing Rodes' attack along Oak Ridge, Lee sent Heth back to his division to await orders. Those orders came in under 30 minutes. Since the end of the morning's attacks, Heth had been getting his division ready to go again. As with Wadsworth, Heth had gotten ready for the order before it came. Similarly, Pender's Division was on hold after actually starting an attack earlier in the morning (and being stopped in its tracks by Hill's staff). They were ready as well. Both divisions moved out without delay.

Rodes appeared on the northern end of the field to behold a spectacle he (and his men) had never seen before... the wide open flank of a Union battle-line spread out for all to see. He began deploying his division. Ewell arrived briefly thereafter and also recognized the opportunity. He issued the orders for Rodes to attack and sent an order to Early coming down from the northeast to do so as well. Both divisions launched on the fly (successfully on Early's part, not as much for Rodes). I coded Early's orders into the Order of Arrival (so to avoid giving the player excessive flexibility). The player is given some freedom with Rodes, with the downside of some choices in how it affects Lee.

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## 11th Corps

As the favorite whipping boys of the Army of the Potomac, I feel 11<sup>th</sup> Corps has been unfairly shown in earlier games. 11<sup>th</sup> Corps was poorly handled and used as a scapegoat to deflect blame for the disaster of the first day's fight. To show this, games usually show them with morale levels that make players wonder why they just didn't all desert the army before they ever got to Gettysburg.

I rated them up a notch in morale... a level I thought they had earned.

In earlier test versions, there was an additional “Looking for Glory” application on the afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> day as well (simulating Barlow's unhinging Schurz's line by advancing to a knoll that now has his name on it). This was found to be unnecessary as von Steinwehr's Division had to be assigned to Cemetery Hill as army reserve. This was a two-headed problem. If von Steinwehr was allowed to move forward early, “looking for glory” or not, 11<sup>th</sup> Corps was just too much for Doles and Early to take on.

Even with von Steinwehr in reserve, the “Looking For Glory” proved to be less than useful in unhinging 11<sup>th</sup> Corps to the point where Early and Doles could take them on with anything like the historical losses. Also, “Looking for Glory” in this case generated its own set of potential abuses—aside from the fact that pushing Barlow to his knoll really didn't mess up the corps' line as much as you might think.

In the end, I had to pull the corps' morale ratings back just a touch (but still better than they are usually shown), leaving von Steinwehr back in reserve, and eliminating the extra “Looking for Glory” to get the right balance of power in the historical fight.

## What does all this do? The ‘Script’ Accusation

Some take one look at the timing mechanics I’ve presented above and think I’m trying to force the game to follow the history... that there is no room left to deviate and so on.

They seem to think the game will follow a script.

I have to point out that since the game is not actually restricted the way they think it is, I can only assume that they are reacting to what they *think* these rules do. An image untainted by *actual* play.

What does happen is that the deviations to the historical “script” start small and grow as time passes (as one would expect). The rules exist so that the deviations from the historical timeline do not start out too large (swamping all further inputs).

I feel players neither want the game to ‘show’ Gettysburg (like a movie) to them, nor do they want something that bares no resemblance to what really went on. Naturally, they (and I) *want* to be put into the driver’s seat *so we can run Gettysburg* and see how we do *within* realistic limits. At either of the extremes (script vs. letting them have laser cannons or some such), I can’t tell how well *I’d* do at Gettysburg as *I’d* either see Gettysburg just as it was, or Gettysburg as done without the boundaries of reality.

So, putting the player in charge of the actual battle (as best we can do with cardboard and dice, anyway) means that the player will be operating a) in the historical environment (no AK-47s), b) under some decisions made before he arrived at this point, c) in an environment where some things are simply out of his control, and d) there are “actors” under him who are still wanting to operate as well (or poorly) as their historical counterparts did.

As a result of those four conditions, deviations from the script Gettysburg to

the player’s Gettysburg start out small (where case b is strongest), but retain inertia throughout (a, c, and d are always involved).

So, as the old saw goes: “You are in command!” But, you are “in command” where some events are already underway, some people are not dependable, and you are running mid-19<sup>th</sup> century armies with the capabilities and limitations of mid-19<sup>th</sup> century armies. If you, like I, want to see how *your own* Gettysburg turns out—this is your chance.

## How on Earth did they pull this off?

One thing that struck me (and some others) in the research for this game was the sheer effectiveness of the Confederate attack on the afternoon of July 2<sup>nd</sup>. You can see what I mean by setting up the situation at 3:45 p.m. and playing to the 7:00 p.m. turn. Then compare what you’ve accomplished versus the historical set up for 7:00 p.m. My guess is you’ll be struck, as I was, with just how much those two and a half divisions accomplished. I really think that they managed to do something just outside the envelope of what is possible given the game system (a good place for the system to be, since it is not designed to model outliers as “normal”). The comparison is well worth your time and consideration as it will shed a new understanding on how hard the fighting in that zone was **and** just how precarious the Union line was becoming when night fell.

Playing forward, into the dark, from the 7:00 p.m. set up is also informative, as those exceptional circumstances are already in play. There is a reason Hancock *had* to send Willard’s Brigade and the 1<sup>st</sup> Minnesota on their death-ride attacks. The Union left was in trouble. Sure, parts of 12<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps were arriving on the scene, but the crisis they were sent to deal with had moved further north—out of their immediate reach.

Repeated testing showed that the historical results are very difficult to achieve. This confirmed to me that the relatively excellent morale ratings you find in the Confederates (especially in Longstreet’s Corps) and the more mundane ones in the Army of the Potomac are in fact accurate for the model and must exist in order to perform close to historical levels—and even then, doing what they did is no easy task.

## The 20th Maine

Fabled in story starting with the writings of both their commander Joshua Chamberlain and Oliver Norton’s *The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top*, the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine’s defense of the flank of Little Round Top achieved an almost religious fervor among fans of Michael Shaara’s *The Killer Angels* (and the resulting movie, *Gettysburg*).

The combination of its place on the line (the end—at *one point in time*, anyway), the post-war build up of Little Round Top as **the** point where the battle was decided, and Shaara’s book, highlighted this one—good, but not spectacular—regiment to a lime light no other formation in the Civil War obtained. I have taken the possibly unpopular course of evaluating the unit based on what it actually did, and not on some popularized appeal.

The 20<sup>th</sup> Maine ended up at the end of the line because of the order of march taken by Vincent’s Brigade to get there. They were not “selected” for this position because of any superior abilities. Once there, they spent around an hour fending off the attacks of one unsupported Confederate regiment—the exhausted 15<sup>th</sup> Alabama. After marching 28 miles from Chambersburg, rushing into the far right of the Rebel battle-line, leading the attack for Hood’s Division, and *climbing up and over* Big Round Top, the 15<sup>th</sup> Alabama put in an attack that caused it to have only about 19% losses and inflicted a little over 30% on the defender.

At that point Chamberlain charged with his regiment (which was about out of ammunition) as a desperate measure. This action inflicted another 83 losses on the

15<sup>th</sup> Alabama (mainly captured POWs).

In the end, the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine inflicted *fewer* losses by firepower (95) on a larger (by about 100 men) attacker (and ran out of ammunition in the process) than were inflicted upon it (120) while defending. And they did this, while relatively fresh compared to their enemy. These are not the marks I expect of a unit achieving the even temporary status of ‘elite’ in the game system.

Now, contrast this performance with an undisputable A, the 16<sup>th</sup> Maine. Here, you have a regiment that marched off to its own destruction *fully realizing* it was being sacrificed to make good the escape of the rest of its brigade. They attacked into swarming Confederate brigades so they could hold some ground to the last man.

In a game sense, the entire action of the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine is in a location where the **terrain** makes them “behave” as an A (due to the modifier). Psychologically, players see an A-rated regiment and start thinking offensively. This is as they should and correctly models the approach players should take with other A-rated units (such as the 16<sup>th</sup> Maine above, the 1<sup>st</sup> Minnesota, and 111<sup>th</sup> New York). But that is not how anyone viewed the use of the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine.

In this last point, one might wonder about the A-rated regiments in Greene’s Brigade; they were strictly defensive in nature. They are indeed violating that provision, but one must remember that Greene’s Brigade held off the better part of Johnson’s Division and did so with an open (and infiltrated) right flank. What they did was most assuredly “A-rated quality”.

So, why is the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine’s location one of the most visited and asked about places at Gettysburg today? This in spite of the heroic sacrifice of many other Union regiments (who have gone forgotten) and the fact that “Buster” never existed. Why? Because of the myth-building that surrounded both Little Round Top and “the end of the line” beginning as soon as the smoke

dispersed and reaching a head with a popular historical novel and movie.

All this said, and the results of my analysis in the game as the standard rating of this unit, I know that some will have opinions so at odds with that thinking that they might be unable to move past this one unit and look at the many other lessons I tried to convey. I can understand this point of view. For them, the optional version of the 20<sup>th</sup> Maine is provided. In my view, the game has bigger fish to fry and I don’t want this one decision to get in the way of players experiencing the whole.

## Some Odds and Ends

Students of the battle will note that Zimmerman’s Battery (Pegram’s Artillery Battalion, A.P. Hill’s Corps) arrives with only three 3-inch Rifles in the game while most sources agree that the battery had four 3-inch Rifles. This is because one gun snapped its axle wheeling into position on Lohr’s Ridge (just west of the game map) and was rendered inoperable.

Given the new rules regarding artillery Morale Losses and Loss Recovery, I was able to insert the temporary losses to artillery units (guns abandoned and later recovered) as actual losses. Before, their loss would be ignored as the guns were later retrieved and the only losses recorded were those that were permanent. The “soft” losses allowed me to better reflect the damage to the battery in terms of caissons lost and horses killed. This works well, as quite a few batteries were out of action because of such losses, but actual *destroyed* guns were fairly rare. Refitting during the night was a major operation for the batteries at the battle, it will be for you as well.

Similarly, I had a number of batteries on the Union side (Heckman and Walton come to mind) that were literally “sent to the rear” after sustaining such damage that they were no longer considered usable. Above and beyond the damage modeled in the system’s

losses and loss recovery, they were simply removed from the order of battle to fight in some future action. Leaving them in as “dead” units would allow the player to rebuild them as well as have them wandering around on the map (a-historically) with a SP (or two) when they were actually on their way back to Washington to refit. I merely removed them from play in scenarios occurring after they were relieved.

Jenkins’ cavalry has been ignored. Jenkins, himself, received a serious head wound by shrapnel near Blocher’s Knoll on July 2<sup>nd</sup>. Nobody informed the next in line (Colonel Milton Ferguson who was commanding the 16<sup>th</sup> Va Cavalry acting as provost at Lee’s HQ) and the activity of this, rather useless, brigade is a complete mystery until they show up with Stuart on July 3<sup>rd</sup> at the East Cavalry Field. As such, the brigade has been ignored in the game (exactly modeling its historical usefulness). To avoid confusion, the 17<sup>th</sup> Va Regiment (riding as a screen for the advance of Early’s Division to the field and a unit of this brigade) has been nominally assigned to 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps and is later removed from play. It spent the 1<sup>st</sup> in reserve for Early’s Division and then was broken up to round up and guard prisoners.

Meanwhile, the 35<sup>th</sup> Virginia Cavalry Battalion was also detached to Ewell’s Corps and screened the approach of Rode’s Division to the field. They were immediately assigned to screening the army’s left flank and did some service in scouting Meade’s right during the remainder of the battle. They were never used en-masse once they had arrived.

Sitting to the rear of Cemetery Ridge (N58.41) is undoubtedly the only “Chicken Bake” hex that will be in this series. In the early afternoon of July 3<sup>rd</sup>, a rather “old and stringy” bird was roasted up for the brass of 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps and (it seems) much of the high-ranking officers in the area at the time. Joshua Chamberlain, who had not had a meal in days, reported to Hancock at this time and wrote of the torture of smelling the roasting bird, but was not offered a



bite to eat. Thanks to the efforts (as probably the only people in history who bothered to try) of Jerry Axel and Rick Barber, I've identified the location of this chicken bake with reasonable certainty. This was based on where Gibbon walked and crested the ridge to observe the cannonade (he was at the bake when it started) and the needs of the officers to locate their meal in a position not filled by some unit or another.

### Many Thanks are due...

This game was a labor of love for many years now. I had enormous help along the way from the usual suspects, but I do want to identify two in particular.

First, there is the indubitable **Rod "Iceman" Miller**, who time and again waded into campaign games of **LCV** testing until his fingers bled. He was instrumental in bringing forth the polish and sheen of the game specific systems as well as the new version 2.0 *LoB* series rules. He took time *he really didn't have* to repeatedly test, to analyze, and to suggest streamlining and improvements on matters large and small. More than a few times, he reached into his pocket to spring for plane tickets and travel expenses to come play the game. Thank you, Rod, I couldn't have done this without you.

Second, is (of course) my favorite partner in crime, **Jerry Axel**. Jerry was, yet again, 100% indispensable in arranging for trips to the field, dropping everything on a moment's notice to come play, set up, or do whatever bizarre task the designer came up with in his usual state of delirium. Jerry was my loyal go-to guy... always willing to say "Sure, I'll drive three hours to come and look at those counters. Just let me finish this coffee. Want me to pick up anything on the way?" You are one of a kind, Jerry, it even makes up for *Shakes the Clown*. Well, almost.

### On the Shoulders of Giants...

Obviously, many of you will compare **LCV** to its *RSS* forerunner, **This Hallowed Ground**.

**THG** (1998) was, and is, Dave Powell's definitive opus on the Battle of Gettysburg. It was the culmination of a lifetime of study and the hard work of a designer who brought the battle to life in the earlier *CWB* games on the topic. It is the ultimate statement of Dave's well-considered viewpoint on the battle.

**LCV** is designed to be complementary to that great work. I had not previously had the opportunity to express my viewpoint on the topic. The need for a *LoB* specific treatment of the battle gave me that opportunity. Like Dave, Gettysburg was one of my first two *ACW* loves (the other being, as most already know, *Antietam*).

If you happen to own both games (and are the envy of many, mind you!), I hope you will find the places where Dave and I have differing visions as a jump-off point for your own contemplation and study of this fantastic subject. Our viewpoints are neither mutually exclusive nor competitive—rather they show the differing ways one can approach a given subject. I hope you find that examination fruitful, entertaining, and enlightening.

### Seniority List Army of the Potomac

Unit	Commander	Rank	Date of Rank
Army	Meade	MG	29 Nov 62
Left Wing	Reynolds	MG	29 Nov 62
Right Wing	Slocum	MG	4 July 62
1 <sup>st</sup> Corps	Doubleday	MG	29 Nov 62
1/1 Division	Wadsworth	BG	9 Aug 61
	Meredith	BG	6 Oct 62
	Cutler	BG	29 Nov 62
2/1 Division	Robinson	BG	28 Apr 62
	Paul	BG	5 Sept 62
	Baxter	BG	12 Mar 63
3/1 Division	Rowley	BG	29 Nov 62
	Stannard	BG	11 Mar 63
	Biddle	Col	—
	Stone	Col	—
2 <sup>nd</sup> Corps	Hancock	MG	29 Nov 62
1/2 Division	Caldwell	BG	28 Apr 62
	Zook	BG	29 Nov 62
	Cross	Col	—
	Kelly	Col	—
	Brooke	Col	—
2/2 Division	Gibbon	BG	2 May 62
	Harrow	BG	29 Nov 62
	Webb	BG	23 Jun 63
	Hall	Col	—
3/2 Division	Hays	BG	29 Sept 62
	Carroll	Col	—
	Smyth	Col	—
	Willard	Col	—

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Commander</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Date of Rank</i>
3 <sup>rd</sup> Corps	Sickels	MG	29 Nov 62
1/3 Division	Birney	MG	20 May 63
	Ward	BG	4 Oct 62
	Graham	BG	29 Nov 62
	de Trobriand	Col	—
2/3 Division	Humphreys	BG	28 Apr 62
	Carr	BG	30 Mar 63
	Burling	Col	—
	Brewster	Col	—
5 <sup>th</sup> Corps	Sykes	MG	29 Nov 62
1/5 Division	Barnes	BG	29 Nov 62
	Tilton	Col	—
	Sweitzer	Col	—
	Vincent	Col	—
2/5 Division	Ayres	BG	29 Nov 62
	Weed	BG	6 Jun 63
	Day	Col	—
	Burbank	Col	—
3/5 Division	Crawford	BG	25 Apr 62
	McCandless	Col	—
	Fisher	Col	—
6 <sup>th</sup> Corps	Sedgwick	MG	4 July 62
1/6 Division	Wright	BG	14 Sept 61
	Russell	BG	29 Nov 62
	Torbert	BG	29 Nov 62
	Bartlett	BG	30 Mar 63
2/6 Division	Howe	BG	11 Jun 62
	Neill	BG	29 Nov 62
	Grant	Col	—
3/6 Division	Newton	MG	30 Mar 63
	Wheaton	BG	29 Nov 62
	Shaler	BG	26 May 63
	Eustis	Col	—
	Nevin	Col	—
11 <sup>th</sup> Corps	Howard	MG	29 Nov 62
1/11 Division	Barlow	BG	19 Sept 62
	Ames	BG	20 May 63
	v. Gilsa	Col	—
2/11 Division	v.Steinwehr	BG	12 Oct 61
	Coster	Col	—
	Smith	Col	—
3/11 Division	Schurz	MG	14 Mar 63
	Schimmelfng	BG	29 Nov 62
	Krzywnski	Col	—
12 <sup>th</sup> Corps	Williams	BG	17 May 61
1/12 Division	Ruger	BG	29 Nov 62
	Lockwood	BG	8 Aug 61
	McDougall	Col	—
	Colgrove	Col	—
2/12 Division	Geary	BG	25 Apr 62
	Greene	BG	28 Apr 62
	Candy	Col	—
	Cobham	Col	—
1 Cav Division	Buford	BG	27 July 62
	Gamble	Col	—
	Devin	Col	—

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Commander</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Date of Rank</i>	
3 Cav Division	Kilpatrick	BG	13 Jun 63	
	Farnsworth	BG	29 Jun 63	
	Merritt	BG	29 Jun 63	
<b>Army of Northern Virginia</b>				
<i>Unit</i>	<i>Commander</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Date of Rank</i>	
Army	R.E. Lee	Gen	14 Jun 61	
	Trimble	MG	17 Jan 63	
	Stuart	MG	25 July 62	
1 <sup>st</sup> Corps	Longstreet	LTG	9 Oct 62	
Pickett Div	Pickett	MG	10 Oct 62	
	Garnett	BG	14 Nov 61	
	Armistead	BG	1 Apr 62	
	Kemper	BG	3 Jun 62	
Hood Div	Hood	MG	10 Oct 62	
	Law	BG	3 Oct 62	
	G.T. Anderson	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Robertson	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Benning	BG	17 Jan 63	
McLaws Div	McLaws	MG	23 May 62	
	Kershaw	BG	13 Feb 62	
	Semmes	BG	11 Mar 62	
	Barksdale	BG	12 Aug 62	
	Wofford	BG	17 Jan 63	
2 <sup>nd</sup> Corps	Ewell	LTG	23 May 63	
Rodes Div	Rodes	MG	2 May 63	
	Daniel	BG	1 Sept 62	
	Doles	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Iverson	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Ramseur	BG	1 Nov 62	
	O'Neal	Col	—	
Johnson Div	Blackford	Maj	—	
	Johnson	MG	28 Feb 63	
	Steuart	BG	6 Mar 62	
	J.M. Jones	BG	15 May 63	
	Walker	BG	15 May 63	
Early Div	Williams	LTC	—	
	Early	MG	17 Jan 63	
	Hays	BG	25 July 62	
	Smith	BG	31 Jan 63	
	Gordon	BG	7 May 63	
Avery	Avery	Col	—	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Corps	A.P. Hill	LTG	24 May 63
	Anderson Div	R.H. Anderson	MG	14 July 62
Wilcox		BG	21 Oct 61	
Mahone		BG	16 Nov 61	
Wright		BG	3 Jun 62	
Posey		BG	1 Nov 62	
Lang	Col	—		
Heth Div	Heth	MG	24 May 63	
	Pettigrew	BG	26 Feb 62	
	Archer	BG	3 Jun 62	
	Davis	BG	15 Sept 62	
	Brcknbrgh	Col	—	
Pender Div	Pender	MG	27 May 63	
	Lane	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Thomas	BG	1 Nov 62	
	Scales	BG	13 Jun 63	
	Perrin	Col	—	